Showing posts with label musevenism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label musevenism. Show all posts

Tuesday, November 17, 2026

THE MOBILE MONEY REVOLUTION IS HERE. BUT WHERE IS THE WEALTH?

Picture a market vendor in downtown Kampala at the end of a busy trading day. She has received payments on her phone, paid suppliers, sent money for school fees and perhaps borrowed to cover an unexpected expense. Hundreds of thousands of shillings have passed through her mobile money account.

Yet, after settling her obligations, her balance is almost zero. Tomorrow she will repeat the process.

She is financially included, certainly. But is she any wealthier?

This is the uncomfortable question as we celebrate one of Uganda's most successful economic transformations.

Ten years ago, this column predicted a revolution in financial services. The trigger was MoKash, a collaboration between MTN Uganda and Commercial Bank of Africa -- now NCBA, putting savings and credit within reach of millions previously excluded from banking.

This column recalled how, barely two decades earlier, opening an account required a minimum balance of Sh100,000, banking hours were restrictive and branches were concentrated along Kampala Road. MoKash offered savings accessible with as little as Sh50 and loans starting at Sh3,000.

The expectation was that technology would mobilise idle money, improve access to credit and transform household welfare. Ten years later, has it delivered on that last promise?

"MTN Uganda's results for the nine months to September 2026 provide a useful starting point.

Its 15.5 million active fintech customers conducted four billion transactions worth Sh166.6 trillion. Transaction values rose 18.3 percent over the comparable period last year, while volumes increased 10.7 percent...

Fintech revenue rose 11.6 percent to Sh902.8 billion, accounting for 31.8 percent of service revenue, close to voice services' 33.9 percent. MTN's mobile money network now has almost 281,000 agents and nearly 203,000 registered merchants.

These are remarkable numbers. In 2015, all Uganda's mobile money operators combined handled transactions worth about Sh30 trillion over an entire year. Today, MTN alone processes more than five times that amount in nine months. The periods and coverage differ, but the transformation is unmistakable.

A farmer receives payment without travelling to town. Parents settle school fees without bank queues. Traders collect payments across the country. Money moves almost instantly, at any hour.

More importantly, the increased velocity of money can improve the allocation of scarce financial resources.

"Previously, substantial amounts sat idle in pockets, under mattresses, in socks and even bras. Digital platforms now make it easier to move that money where it is needed, bridging temporary cash-flow strains and working-capital deficits...

A trader awaiting customer payments can borrow to replenish stock; a farmer can secure an advance to finance harvesting. When digital balances enter savings and lending channels, money can be mobilised for productive activity rather than lying idle. Faster circulation can support more economic activity without a proportionate increase in the money supply.

But faster circulation does not automatically mean wealth creation. Its value depends on what the money finances.

Last year, this column noted that MTN Mobile Money's 2024 after-tax profit of Sh250 billion had overtaken Absa Uganda's Sh177 billion. The newcomers were not merely challenging traditional banking; they were outperforming some established institutions. Banks have responded with digital services and agency networks, improving access for everyone.

Yet access and prosperity are different things.

The 2023 FinScope Uganda survey found that financial inclusion had reached 81 percent of adults, but 70 percent reported insufficient income to cover expenses. Nine out of ten were dissatisfied with their financial circumstances...

One can transact Sh100,000 daily and remain just as poor at year's end. MTN's Sh166.6 trillion represents cumulative transfers, not newly created wealth. The same shilling may change hands repeatedly.

We must distinguish money moving more efficiently from wealth actually accumulating.

Digital credit illustrates the dilemma. Borrowing to buy profitable stock can increase income. Repeatedly borrowing for consumption, especially at high effective interest rates, can deepen financial distress.

MTN reports that advanced financial services, including payments and lending, increased revenue by 26.2 percent and now account for a third of fintech revenue. But how much of that activity finances production rather than bringing tomorrow's earnings forward to pay today's bills?

The encouraging news is that mobile money has evolved beyond transfers and loans. What were once intimidating, largely elite financial products are increasingly available through an ordinary phone.

There are savings products such as MoKash; unit trusts through Yinvesta and XENO, including funds with exposure to bonds and equities; and life and hospital insurance through Family Cover by MoMo. Investors can open a Securities Central Depository account through MTN MoMo, a gateway to the Uganda Securities Exchange, although buying and selling listed shares still requires a licensed broker.

This is an extraordinary democratisation of opportunity. A market vendor no longer needs a wealthy acquaintance or an imposing bank office to begin saving, investing or insuring her family.

The fintech innovators will surely keep simplifying access and bringing more products within reach. But perhaps the greatest obstacle is no longer technology. It is knowledge, habits and confidence.

A massive financial education effort is now required: explaining compound returns, the difference between savings and investment, the costs of debt, investment risk, insurance and the discipline of building assets before consumption. Operators, regulators, schools, employers and savings groups all have a role.

"Success should no longer be measured only by accounts opened, agents recruited or trillions transferred, but by households building emergency reserves, investing regularly, borrowing productively and protecting themselves from financial shocks...

The first financial revolution was about inclusion. The second must be about financial stability, through education, investment and ownership.

Tuesday, November 10, 2026

“UEB” IS COMING BACK. HAVE THE REASONS WE KILLED IT DISAPPEARED?

On November 13, 2018, this column ran under the headline “We Don’t Want UEB Back.” Eight years later, here we are again.

This week Cabinet renewed its directive to merge Uganda Electricity Generation Company Limited (UEGCL), Uganda Electricity Transmission Company Limited (UETCL) and Uganda Electricity Distribution Company Limited (UEDCL), effectively reconstituting the Uganda Electricity Board (UEB) dismantled a quarter-century ago.

The argument is familiar: eliminate duplication, reduce administrative costs and coordinate the electricity value chain better. Three boards and three management teams probably cost more than one. But are these the costs that should concern us most?

"We did not unbundle UEB because we had too many managers. We did so principally because the sector was starved of investment, and the old structure could not attract the financing required...

As recalled in that 2018 column, then Energy Minister Richard Kaijuka complained in 1998 that political interference was frustrating reform. UEB struggled with unreliable supply, enormous power losses, poor collections and tariffs too low to finance expansion.

Government, whose revenues were already inadequate for its obligations, could not finance the electricity infrastructure needed for a growing economy.

The 1999 reforms separated generation, transmission and distribution, creating specialised companies and opening the door to private participation. Eskom and Umeme later came in under concessions, while independent producers invested in generation.

The transformation has been substantial. Installed capacity has increased from about 180MW at Nalubaale to more than 2,000MW, and customer numbers have increased many times over. The era of crippling daily load-shedding has largely passed, although tariffs and distribution reliability remain challenges.

Of course the reforms were imperfect. Investors negotiated returns that contributed to higher tariffs, and some contracts were expensive. But in “Umeme and the Importance of the River”

in May 2024, this column asked the question that still matters: if private investment is considered too costly, where will its replacement come from?

Umeme invested almost $800m over its concession because it could borrow against commercial revenues and contractual arrangements, instead of waiting for Treasury releases. That distinction was central to “Umeme Exit and the End of an Era” in April 2025.

Also when we say the contracts are too expensive, expensive as opposed to what? Hours of loadshedding?

Today the financing question is even more urgent.

Uganda’s public debt has crossed the psychologically important 50-percent-of-GDP line. It stood at 54.3 percent at the end of June 2026. Of the Shs84.3 trillion 2026/27 budget, Shs33.4 trillion—almost four shillings in every ten, is earmarked for debt servicing, including principal repayments. Interest payments alone are projected to absorb roughly three in every ten shillings of domestic revenue.

That is an extraordinary claim on scarce public resources, before we consider schools, hospitals, roads or the electricity infrastructure still to be built.

And cheap money cannot be taken for granted. Uganda's government has declared that the country has attained middle-income status, although the World Bank still classifies it as low-income and it remains eligible for concessional IDA financing. As incomes rise, however, access to the cheapest development funding cannot be assumed indefinitely.

Against that backdrop, do we really need to saddle the national budget with additional obligations that private investors and commercially financed utilities were already carrying?

The electricity industry needs billions more for generation, transmission and distribution to support the ATMS strategy and the ambition of a tenfold larger economy by 2040. Moving responsibilities onto a government balance sheet does not make them cheaper. It may simply transfer their risks to taxpayers.

A merged utility could work, but only if its operating rules differ fundamentally from those of an ordinary government department.

Consider procurement. Since UEDCL took over distribution from Umeme in April 2025, consumers have complained of outages, delayed connections and slow replacement of equipment. The company inherited substantial challenges, but bureaucratic procurement cannot be allowed to aggravate them.

A failed transformer cannot wait months for committee approvals. The utility needs fast, professionally managed purchasing arrangements, with transparent competition, independent audits and meaningful sanctions for abuse.

Then comes financing. In “Cheap Power Is Good But…” in July 2023, this column argued that government-owned utilities must earn sufficient returns to maintain and expand their infrastructure.

The revived company must retain earnings, provide properly for depreciation, earn a commercially credible return and raise long-term funds against its own cash flows. Public guarantees and subsidies, where necessary, must be explicit rather than concealed in the utility’s accounts.

And what about governance? Will politicians resist intervening in appointments, procurement and tariffs? Will public institutions pay their bills? Will the regulator remain sufficiently independent to insist on transparent costs across generation, transmission and distribution?

In “Why Uganda Should Not Revert to Parastatals”

in December 2018, this column argued that the failure of public enterprises was not simply a lack of financing, but the absence of commercial discipline and insulation from politics.

Have those shortcomings disappeared?

The savings from eliminating boards and executives are likely modest beside investment needs and technical losses. Consolidation might improve coordination; it could equally obscure responsibility for failures.

Before proceeding, Cabinet should publish a credible business case setting out measurable savings, procurement safeguards, financing arrangements and protections against political interference.

In 2018, this column warned that we might reconstitute UEB only to discover that we needed to unbundle it again.

The question is not whether we can bring UEB back. It is whether we have fixed the problems that killed it—or are merely giving them a new corporate address?

Tuesday, October 27, 2026

FROM CANNED FISH TO DOLLAR EARNINGS

In the late 1980s, donor-supplied canned chicken curry and fish helped feed pupils in schools across Uganda, then emerging from years of conflict. Agricultural production had been disrupted and the country needed assistance to recover.

Around 1990, the supplies were withdrawn. I remember the announcement almost provoking a riot at my school in western Uganda. We had become so accustomed to Groot and mackerel that we could hardly imagine school meals without them.

Younger Ugandans may wonder what I am talking about. But the lesson endures: emergency assistance can quietly become an entitlement.

Fast-forward to today's shilling, which has breached the psychological Shs4,000-to-the-dollar barrier. Some commentators point to diminishing dollar inflows following USAID's closure and restrictions on NGOs. Their prescription? Re-ingratiate ourselves with donors so the dollars return.

Here is an unpopular opinion: painful as declining aid will be in the short term, it could ultimately do Uganda considerable good...

Certainly, aid has saved lives, supported education and sustained essential services. Its sudden withdrawal threatens real suffering. But perhaps we should ask not how to restore our dependence, but how to outgrow it.

While presented as benevolence, aid is also an instrument of influence. Donor governments pursue humanitarian objectives, but also political, economic and security interests.

Following the 2023 Anti-Homosexuality Act, the World Bank suspended new financing approvals, citing concerns about discrimination, before resuming in 2025 after safeguards were agreed. The United States withdrew Uganda's preferential trade access under AGOA. Whatever one's position on the legislation or donors' concerns, the economic leverage was unmistakable.

Earlier structural-adjustment programmes linked financing to privatisation and liberalisation. Foreign assistance has supported domestic policy advocacy, including initiatives surrounding the Domestic Violence Act, although this was not necessarily formal aid conditionality. Security cooperation also influences donor relations. He who pays the piper can influence the tune.

"One understands the grumbling about aid cuts, especially from sections of the urban elite who have benefited handsomely from the aid economy. Donor-funded organisations, consultancies, workshops and professional jobs have sustained a comfortable urban class.

Kampala's sprawling suburbs and imposing upcountry mansions, many occupied mainly during festivities, are proof enough...

We need to look beyond the comfort of a relatively small, entitled elite towards spreading the benefits of economic recovery to the majority. At last count, 64 percent of Ugandan households engage in agriculture. Raising their productivity and incomes must be central to development.

But critics say Uganda lacks the resources. Really?

Electronic-money transactions reached Shs366 trillion in 2025, up from Shs286 trillion in 2024, exceeding Uganda's annual economic output of approximately Shs250 trillion. Growth that seems to be far from plateauing. Turnover is not investable capital; the same shilling circulates repeatedly. Still, it reveals the scale of domestic financial activity and signals the possibilities.

The challenge is aggregating more of that activity into savings and productive investment. NSSF has almost Shs33 trillion in assets. SACCOs, pension funds, unit trusts and insurers can mobilise fragmented savings into substantial capital pools, provided projects are commercially viable and savers protected.

"We cannot tax ourselves into prosperity. We must produce ourselves into prosperity...

Coffee shows what a sustained production strategy can accomplish. From approximately 4.2 million 60-kilogram bags in 2015/16, output more than doubled to eight million by 2020/21. Recent annual exports have likewise exceeded eight million bags, earning billions of dollars.

At that level Uganda is approaching genuine industrial scale. Consider Nestlé, which says it buys over 13 million 60-kilogram bags, from more than 20 countries. Our annual crop is already equivalent to roughly three-fifths of that global giant's purchases.

With a clear understanding of the value chain—from cultivation, grading and trading to roasting, soluble coffee, packaging, branding and retail—we can deliberately build Ugandan enterprises that capture more value from every cup.

Rather than remain primarily a supplier of anonymous beans, why not develop roasting and processing capacity where commercially competitive, nurture Ugandan brands and negotiate better access to global consumers? We cannot dictate world coffee prices, but we can take greater control of our coffee's destiny...

Dairy offers another example. Uganda's milk production doubled from 2.7 billion litres in 2020 to 5.4 billion in 2024, while dairy exports rose substantially.

Why not replicate such efforts in commercial goat production through better breeding, animal health and market access? Fish farming and processing can expand earnings while protecting our lakes. Intellectual property—software, music, film, publishing and technology—can earn foreign exchange without shipping containers overseas.

All this demands better roads, electricity, storage, affordable finance, extension services and predictable taxes. Rather than seeking another $100 million in donor assistance, what would it take to generate another $100 million in annual exports?

Yet the greatest obstacle may not be economic. It may be political.

A vibrant private sector creates alternative centres of wealth and influence. Successful entrepreneurs, financial institutions and business associations will demand accountability and sometimes disagree with government. For political elites suspicious of independent power centres, that requires a leap of faith.

"Real prosperity will require the intellectual flexibility to let economic influence flourish beyond political control...

Declining aid guarantees none of these reforms. Government could simply borrow more, raise taxes or slash services.

But the opportunity is to shift our national conversation from donor money towards domestic capital, higher production and exports. I remember the uproar over our disappearing canned fish. We survived without that menu.

Real independence is not merely having our flag and anthem. It is having the capacity to pay our bills, finance production and determine our economic future. Perhaps the greatest favour our development partners can do us is help us reach the point where we no longer need their generosity.

 

Tuesday, October 20, 2026

WE HAVE BEEN HERE BEFORE: THE PRICE OF DEFENDING THE SHILLING

Contrary to the impression the chattering masses might create, the Bank of Uganda’s decision to raise its Central Bank Rate (CBR) to 12 per cent is neither shocking nor unprecedented. We have been here before, and history offers a lesson: the way out is fiscal discipline, not populist concessions that postpone the pain and make the eventual adjustment more expensive.

Inflation, caused when demand outstrips supply, is not just a number. It erodes purchasing power, discourages productive investment and can reward speculation over production.

Uganda introduced the CBR in July 2011 as part of its shift towards inflation targeting. Inflation was surging and the shilling was weakening. The central bank raised the rate from 13 per cent to 23 per cent by November, as inflation reached around 30 per cent, levels last experienced in 1992.

The CBR influences how commercial banks price loans, alongside their funding costs, operating expenses and assessment of borrower risk. When the CBR rises, borrowing generally becomes more expensive. Businesses pay more for working capital and investment finance, while households face higher loan costs. The intention is to moderate spending and credit growth, ease inflationary pressure and help stabilise the currency.

The rate subsequently fell as conditions improved. It was cut during the Covid-19 pandemic to support activity, then held at 9.75 per cent from October 2024 until this latest increase. On October 14, 2026, the Bank of Uganda raised it by 2.25 percentage points, citing the weakening shilling, rising oil prices and the risk of imported inflation.

The familiar squeeze

Uganda needs dollars for fuel, machinery, medicines, industrial inputs and consumer goods. Higher international oil prices increase the import bill, while depreciation means importers need more shillings to buy the same quantity of dollars. Transport, manufacturing, agriculture and distribution become more expensive, with costs passed on to consumers.

Foreign-exchange inflows also face headwinds. Reduced development financing has disrupted NGO programmes, employment and procurement. The precise amount of foreign exchange lost through funding withdrawals and the suspension of civil society organisations remains unclear, but fewer grant-funded dollars circulating through local salaries and suppliers can weaken economic activity.

Higher interest rates may moderate credit growth and import demand, encourage investment in shilling assets and signal a commitment to price stability. But they cannot manufacture dollars...

There is another possible consequence worth watching: government borrowing costs. If the rate increase helps slow the shilling’s depreciation, investors may find shilling-denominated government securities more attractive. If the pressure on the currency persists, government may have to offer higher returns to attract sufficient demand for its bonds.

A rise in bond yields is therefore possible, although not automatic. Existing bonds have fixed coupon rates; their market prices and yields adjust as demand changes. New issues may need to offer more competitive returns. Higher yields could attract investors towards shilling assets and support demand for the currency, but the effect depends on confidence, inflation expectations and the availability of foreign exchange. It also means government could pay more to borrow.

Kenya's fuel-subsidy lesson

Kenya offers a warning about shielding consumers from every increase in fuel prices. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, international oil prices surged. Kenya subsidised fuel to cushion households and businesses, but the subsidy bill grew and delayed payments to oil marketers contributed to supply shortages.

When Kenya removed its petrol subsidy in September 2022, petrol prices rose by about 13 per cent in a month, with diesel and kerosene also becoming more expensive. The adjustment was painful, illustrating the difficulty of withdrawing support after consumers have become accustomed to artificially restrained prices...

The lesson is not that governments should abandon households to global price shocks. It is that suppressing price signals for too long accumulates fiscal costs and can make the eventual adjustment more abrupt. Gradual, transparent price movements give households and businesses time to adapt. Targeted support for the most vulnerable is preferable to an open-ended subsidy for everyone.

Resist the populist temptation

Uganda should be wary of proposals to remove taxes on fuel simply to bring down pump prices. Fuel taxes finance public services and infrastructure. Removing them without replacing the revenue or cutting expenditure widens the fiscal deficit. Government must then borrow more, cut spending elsewhere or accept a larger financing gap.

More borrowing can compete with businesses for credit and put pressure on interest rates, undermining the central bank’s efforts. Cheaper fuel may also encourage consumption of an imported product when foreign exchange is already under pressure.

Relief should be targeted, affordable and transparent. Protecting vulnerable households is not the same as subsidising fuel consumption for everyone.

Discipline is the way through

Government must prioritise expenditure, improve revenue collection and manage borrowing carefully. The private sector must improve efficiency and expand exports. Uganda needs to earn more dollars through coffee, tourism, minerals, manufacturing and other productive activities.

We have been here before. The way through is to maintain fiscal discipline long enough for imbalances to ease, rather than trade long-term stability for short-term applause.

Ugandans deserve relief from rising costs. But relief that leaves the country with less revenue, more debt and a larger foreign-exchange bill may simply make tomorrow’s adjustment more painful.

The shilling will not be defended by subsidising imported consumption. It will be defended by living within our means, earning more foreign exchange and resisting the temptation to postpone difficult decisions.


Sunday, October 18, 2026

THE GASHUMBA-KAYANJA FEUD: PERHAPS CHRISTIANITY NEEDS THIS RECKONING

The most remarkable thing about Frank Gashumba's Shs500 million challenge to Uganda's miracle-working pastors is not the money. It is how quickly a question about healing became a confrontation over religious authority.

Last week, the outspoken social commentator challenged pastors, prophets and apostles who claim miraculous healing powers to accompany him to a hospital and demonstrate those powers on critically ill patients. He initially offered Shs200 million before raising the stakes to Shs500 million.

Gashumba did not initially name any particular pastor. Nevertheless, the backlash was swift, most notably from Pastor Robert Kayanja of Miracle Centre Cathedral, who publicly warned Gashumba of dire consequences, including death. Gashumba's family subsequently accused the pastor of extending curses to four generations of their descendants.

"What began as a challenge to substantiate extraordinary claims has degenerated into an ugly exchange involving spouses and children...

Beneath the noise lies an opportunity to examine Christianity, particularly the relationship between believers, pastors and God.

Perhaps this controversy is precisely what Ugandan Christianity needs.

Christians must distinguish faith in God from faith in those who claim to represent Him. Pastors are human beings, subject to the same weaknesses and failings as everyone else. Their calling, eloquence, wealth, popularity or ability to attract large congregations does not confer infallibility or prove divine approval.

Christianity has grappled with false prophets and religious opportunists since its earliest days. Jesus warned in Matthew 7:15 against false prophets who disguise themselves as sheep but are inwardly ravenous wolves, saying believers would recognise them by their fruits.

The implication is clear:

"Christians have a responsibility to scrutinise their religious leaders, not surrender their judgment to them...

The Apostle Paul reinforced this principle in 1 Thessalonians 5:21, urging believers to test everything and hold on to what is good. Questioning a pastor is not necessarily questioning God; discernment may be an expression of genuine faith.

This distinction seems to have been lost in the present controversy.

Gashumba says his criticism concerns people he considers fraudulent religious leaders, not God or Christianity. Pastor Kayanja maintains that the miracles associated with his ministry are genuine and come from God. His son has also emphasised that pastors themselves do not heal; only Jesus does.

That is an important theological distinction. If the power belongs to God, no pastor should feel personally threatened by questions about its exercise.

Gashumba's challenge nevertheless has limitations. Faith cannot be reduced to a laboratory experiment, and God cannot be summoned to perform miracles for a cash reward. Nor should seriously ill patients become props in a public spectacle...

But claims of miraculous healing, particularly where desperate people are encouraged to part with money or abandon medical treatment, should not be beyond reasonable scrutiny. There is a world of difference between believing that God can perform miracles and accepting that everyone who claims to perform them is telling the truth.

History offers a powerful lesson. In 1517, Martin Luther challenged the sale and promotion of indulgences, through which believers were offered remission of punishment for sins in exchange for payments. His Ninety-Five Theses helped ignite the Protestant Reformation, challenging entrenched authority and transforming the relationship between believers, Scripture and religious institutions.

The irony should not escape us. Some Protestant traditions that emerged from a rebellion against abuses of religious authority now face similar questions about money, power and accountability.

Where medieval Christians encountered indulgences, today's believers sometimes encounter promises of breakthroughs, deliverance, healing and prosperity tied to financial contributions. The language has changed; the temptation to commercialise people's relationship with God has not.

This is not to suggest that all pastors are charlatans or that churches should not receive financial support. Many religious organisations provide valuable education, healthcare, counselling and humanitarian assistance. The Kayanja ministry, for example, points to its humanitarian activities and says it maintains financial records subject to tax-authority scrutiny.

Such contributions deserve acknowledgement. However, good works do not place any institution beyond legitimate questioning.

Jesus himself drove merchants and money changers from the temple when commercial activity corrupted its sacred purpose. Christianity has never been comfortable with reducing God's blessings to merchandise.

The controversy also raises questions about how religious leaders respond to criticism. In Luke 6:28, Jesus instructed his followers to bless those who curse them and pray for those who mistreat them.

It is telling, therefore, that some pastors responded to Gashumba by cursing him and invoking death or misfortune. Even allowing for the emotions generated by his provocations, such responses seem difficult to reconcile with Christ's teachings on forgiveness and love. A pastor's moral authority is tested most clearly when challenged, not when addressing a receptive congregation.

In some ministries, the pastor's word becomes indistinguishable from God's word. Questioning the pastor is portrayed as rebellion against God, while loyalty to the leader becomes a measure of spiritual commitment.

This creates fertile ground for manipulation, encouraging believers to outsource their judgment, financial decisions and even medical choices to religious authorities. Christianity is fundamentally about a personal relationship with God, not unquestioning dependence on a spiritual intermediary. Pastors should guide and empower believers, not make them permanently dependent on a leader.

Perhaps the lasting value of Gashumba's intervention will have little to do with whether anybody collects his Shs500 million. It may instead lie in prompting ordinary Christians to ask:

What exactly do I believe, and why? Does my pastor's teaching agree with Scripture? Am I giving out of conviction or fear? Does my faith make me more compassionate, responsible and independent, or increasingly dependent on another human being?

These questions do not weaken Christianity. They can strengthen it.

Ugandan Christianity may be approaching its own moment of reflection. This need not produce another schism. It could produce a more discerning congregation, more accountable religious leadership and a renewed emphasis on Christ's teachings rather than the personalities of individual pastors.

Ultimately, the greatest danger to Christianity is not Frank Gashumba or anyone else who questions religious leaders. It is the possibility that believers have become so attached to their pastors that they can no longer distinguish criticism of a man from an attack on God.

"God does not need protection from legitimate questions. Nor should a pastor's reputation become the foundation upon which anyone builds their faith....

If this controversy reminds Christians to put their faith in God rather than in those who claim to speak for Him, Gashumba will have performed a valuable public service.

And he will not have needed to perform a single miracle.

Thursday, October 15, 2026

SHS4000 TO THE DOLLAR: THE WARNING WE HEARD, THE LESSONS WE IGNORED

Uganda's exchange-rate debate has a long memory, even if economic policy sometimes appears to have a short one. Every time the shilling comes under pressure, the country revisits familiar arguments: the strength of the US dollar, speculative activity, government spending, central bank intervention and the cost of defending the currency.

Yet the exchange rate keeps moving. From around Shs2,000 to the dollar in the early 2010s, to Shs3,000 in 2015, and now beyond Shs4,000 in October 2026, the direction of travel tells a story about an economy whose appetite for foreign exchange has repeatedly outstripped its ability to earn it.

A review of the exchange-rate debate over the years, reveals a recurring lesson: monetary policy can manage the pace of depreciation, but a lasting solution depends on the productive capacity of the economy.

The warning signs were there

In 2011, the shilling came under intense pressure, provoking complaints from importers and calls for government intervention. The debate was already about more than the price of the dollar. It was about whether the authorities could defend a particular exchange rate when the economy was not generating sufficient foreign currency to sustain it.

In March 2015, when the dollar crossed Shs3,000, this column published “The Shilling Collapse Is Our Fault, Not the Dollar's”. The argument was not that international developments were irrelevant. The US Federal Reserve was moving towards tighter monetary policy, the dollar was strengthening globally, and commodity prices were under pressure.

But Uganda also had domestic weaknesses. Its export earnings were vulnerable to commodity-price fluctuations, while demand for imported fuel, machinery, manufactured goods and other products continued to consume foreign exchange.

The warning was that attempting to hold the dollar at Shs2,000 without the economic fundamentals to support that rate would be futile. The exchange rate could be managed, but not indefinitely divorced from the country's capacity to earn dollars.

Adam Mugume's warning: Act before inflation takes hold

An especially revealing contribution to this debate came in October 2015, when Adam Mugume, then Bank of Uganda director of research, explained the central bank's thinking on depreciation and inflation.

In an interview published by Business Vision on October 12, under the headline “Uganda Bracing Itself for More Inflation”, Mugume explained that the central bank had tightened monetary policy in anticipation of inflationary pressure. The concerns included a deteriorating balance of payments, the prospect of tighter US monetary policy and weakening foreign-exchange inflows.

The interview highlighted pressures across foreign direct investment, workers' remittances, exports and tourism, alongside rising imports. Depreciation would increase the domestic cost of imported goods and eventually feed into inflation. Waiting until inflation had surged would make it more difficult and expensive to contain.

The follow-up discussion in this column's October 2015 archive illustrates the enduring policy dilemma. Higher interest rates can support the shilling and restrain inflation, but they can also make borrowing more expensive, slow investment and constrain economic growth.

Mugume's warning remains relevant. The Bank of Uganda can influence liquidity, expectations and the pace of depreciation, but it cannot determine the country's underlying supply of foreign exchange. That depends on exports, services, investment, remittances and other inflows, set against the economy's demand for dollars.

Depreciation is not a straight line

The subsequent history of the shilling demonstrates why individual exchange-rate milestones should not be mistaken for a permanent trend.

In 2022, the dollar approached Shs4,000 as the US Federal Reserve raised interest rates aggressively to combat inflation. Higher yields on dollar assets encouraged global investors to favour the US currency, putting pressure on emerging-market currencies, including the shilling.

The shilling subsequently recovered some ground. In 2024, stronger foreign-exchange inflows, including those associated with coffee exports, helped support the currency.

These recoveries matter. They demonstrate that exchange rates respond to changing supply and demand conditions and that depreciation is not necessarily a one-way journey.

But temporary appreciation does not automatically mean that the structural problem has been resolved. A good coffee season, a surge in capital inflows or improved investor sentiment can strengthen the shilling without fundamentally changing Uganda's dependence on imported goods and external financing.

From coffee to gold: Uganda's export transformation

The story of the shilling is not one of economic stagnation. Uganda has made meaningful progress in expanding its export earnings and diversifying the range of goods and services it sells abroad.

The historical record in this column's Uganda exports archive documents the expansion of the export basket beyond traditional agricultural commodities. Fish, flowers, cement, manufactured products, electricity and regional trade have created additional sources of foreign exchange.

The transformation has continued. In “When Coffee Ruled the Uganda Shilling”, published in April 2026, this column examined the emergence of gold as Uganda's leading export earner. Coffee receipts were estimated at about $2.5 billion in 2025, while gold earnings reached approximately $6.4 billion.

Official data also illustrate the scale of the expansion. In the first eleven months of financial year 2025/26, merchandise export receipts reached $14.47 billion, up 34.4 per cent from $10.76 billion in the corresponding period a year earlier. The growth was driven principally by coffee and gold. See the Ministry of Finance's March 2026 economic performance report.

This is significant progress. In the past, the timing of the coffee harvest could have a pronounced effect on the supply of dollars in the domestic market. Gold, alongside other agricultural and non-agricultural exports, has broadened the sources of foreign exchange and altered the seasonal pattern of inflows.

It would therefore be misleading to explain the shilling's depreciation simply by claiming that Uganda is not exporting enough or that nothing has changed in the productive economy.

Diversification, however, does not eliminate vulnerability. Gold and coffee prices fluctuate, and export receipts do not necessarily translate into an equivalent increase in dollars available in the domestic market at the moment importers need them. The timing of repatriation, the foreign-exchange requirements of businesses and the movement of capital all influence the exchange rate.

There is also a new concentration risk. Gold's growing importance means that Uganda is more exposed to developments in that market. The destination of exports matters, too: a concentration of gold shipments in particular markets can leave receipts vulnerable to changes in trading arrangements and demand.

The broader discussion in this column's Uganda gold archive is relevant to the currency debate. Gold can provide a powerful source of foreign exchange, but the durability of that benefit depends on the value retained locally, the industry's structure and how the proceeds are used.

Uganda has made progress in earning more dollars. The question is whether those earnings are keeping pace with the economy's total demand for foreign exchange.

The trade deficit: Where the dollars go

The merchandise trade balance provides part of the answer. It measures the difference between the value of goods Uganda exports and the value of goods it imports. When imports exceed exports, the country must finance the gap through other foreign-exchange inflows, such as services earnings, remittances, investment, borrowing or the use of reserves.

Uganda's problem is that import demand can grow just as rapidly as export earnings, sometimes faster. In June 2026, merchandise imports rose by 33.2 per cent year-on-year to $1.88 billion, while exports increased by 11 per cent to $1.28 billion. The monthly merchandise trade deficit consequently widened to approximately $598 million. The figures appear in the Ministry of Finance's July 2026 economic performance report.

The import bill reflects more than consumer demand. Uganda imports petroleum products, machinery, vehicles, chemicals, industrial inputs and equipment needed to expand productive capacity. Some of these imports are essential to future growth and export production. Treating every import as a problem would therefore be a mistake.

The challenge is to ensure that the productive capacity created by these imports eventually generates sufficient additional income, including foreign exchange, to justify the expenditure. Machinery that enables a manufacturer to export more can strengthen the economy's external position over time. An import that produces no corresponding increase in future earning capacity can leave the country more dependent on fresh foreign-exchange inflows.

The merchandise trade balance is not, however, the same as the current-account balance. The latter also includes trade in services, primary income and transfers. Uganda may earn more from exports while paying more for freight, insurance, technical services and income accruing to foreign investors. These outflows help explain why rising merchandise export receipts do not necessarily translate into an equivalent improvement in the country's overall external position.

The IMF's 2026 Article IV assessment of Uganda highlighted the continuing current-account deficit despite strong coffee and gold exports. Investment-related imports, gold imports and a wider services-account deficit were among the pressures.

The distinction matters when explaining the shilling. The exchange rate responds not just to the value of goods crossing Uganda's borders but to the country's entire flow of foreign-currency receipts and payments, alongside capital movements and market expectations.

Uganda has made progress on exports, but the benefits are being offset, at least in part, by a substantial import bill and other external payments. The policy task is not simply to export more, but to improve the net foreign-exchange contribution of economic growth.

Why Shs4,000 now?

The move beyond Shs4,000 should not be interpreted as proof that Uganda's export strategy has failed. Rather, it demonstrates that export growth and currency stability are related but not interchangeable.

A country can earn more dollars than ever before and still experience depreciation if its demand for dollars rises faster, if its other external payments increase, or if investors shift their portfolios towards foreign currencies.

The immediate pressures include international oil prices, geopolitical uncertainty, demand for imports and the timing of foreign-exchange inflows. The longer-term issue is whether Uganda can convert its expanding export base into a sufficiently strong and dependable net supply of foreign exchange.

The shilling traded around Shs3,604 to the dollar in March 2026. By October, commercial bank quotations had crossed Shs4,000. The Daily Monitor reported the record low on October 5.

On October 14, the Bank of Uganda raised its Central Bank Rate by 2.25 percentage points, from 9.75 to 12 per cent, in response to mounting inflation and exchange-rate risks.

Higher interest rates can make shilling-denominated investments more attractive, restrain demand and help contain inflation expectations. If government bond yields rise in response to the new policy rate and market conditions, the additional return could attract demand for shillings and moderate depreciation.

However, this outcome is not guaranteed. Higher borrowing costs can discourage investment, increase the government's debt-servicing burden and constrain private-sector expansion. Nor can monetary tightening create export earnings overnight.

Who pays for a weaker shilling?

Depreciation redistributes purchasing power. Importers pay more for dollar-priced goods, and consumers face higher prices for fuel, medicines, machinery and other essentials. Businesses with dollar-denominated debts face higher repayment costs in shilling terms.

Exporters, tourism operators and recipients of remittances may receive more shillings for every dollar earned. Investors with foreign-currency assets can also benefit from the translation effect when those assets are valued in shillings.

But the benefits are not uniform. An exporter that depends on imported fertiliser, fuel, packaging or machinery may find that rising input costs erode the advantage of a weaker currency.

The deeper question is whether Uganda is becoming better at earning foreign exchange. Coffee and gold have become important sources of export receipts, while tourism and remittances remain significant. Oil production offers further possibilities.

Yet a country cannot sustainably finance an expanding import bill through occasional commodity booms, external borrowing or the sale of foreign reserves.

The real defence of the shilling

The debate has repeatedly returned to the same choices: intervene or let the market work; raise interest rates or protect affordable credit; defend purchasing power today or preserve the capacity to invest for tomorrow.

These are genuine policy trade-offs. The Bank of Uganda can manage liquidity, anchor inflation expectations and respond to disorderly movements in the currency market. It cannot manufacture an unlimited supply of dollars.

Government must complement monetary policy with fiscal discipline, predictable investment rules and productive public expenditure. Businesses must invest in productivity and exports rather than depend indefinitely on preferential access to foreign exchange. Farmers and manufacturers need better infrastructure, reliable energy and affordable finance to compete internationally.

Uganda must also capture more value from what it produces. Processed and branded coffee, agricultural manufacturing, tourism, mineral beneficiation and other tradable services offer opportunities to earn more from each dollar of foreign exchange generated.

Shs4,000 should therefore be treated as a price signal, not automatically as either a national catastrophe or an achievement. It tells us that, under prevailing conditions, demand for foreign exchange is exceeding supply at the previous price.

The lesson from the warnings of 2011, the debate in 2015 and the subsequent recoveries is that defending the shilling cannot be the responsibility of monetary policy alone.

Uganda has expanded and diversified its exports. That progress should be recognised. But the next challenge is to ensure that export growth, domestic production and the wider balance of payments improve fast enough to meet the country's rising demand for foreign exchange.

The strongest defence of the shilling is an economy that earns more dollars, creates more value from its exports and reduces its dependence on imports that it could competitively produce at home.

The dollar may rise or fall. The more important question is whether Uganda will finally address the economic fundamentals that turn every new exchange-rate milestone into another national debate.

Tuesday, September 15, 2026

POWER, MUHOOZI AND THE MAN STILL HOLDING THE CARDS

Power is the ability to influence people, events and things—to make something happen that otherwise might not happen.

Money is power. Office is power. Information is power. Control of institutions is power. The ability to reward, protect, punish or exclude is power.

But power is rarely an end in itself. It is a means to an end. You need power to implement an agenda, protect an interest, change society or preserve an existing political order.

Which is why the first order of business after acquiring power is usually to keep it.

This is where the world of power separates itself from the ordinary morality by which most of us conduct our lives...

Most people are brought up to think in neat categories: good and evil, right and wrong, loyalty and betrayal. The successful power player has to think additionally in terms of interests, consequences, alliances, timing and survival.

Yesterday's enemy may become today's ally. Yesterday's friend can become tomorrow's liability. One individual may be sacrificed to preserve a much larger coalition. Intentions may be concealed because revealing them prematurely allows adversaries to organise.

This amorality does not mean that everything done in pursuit of power is right or lawful. Far from it. But to understand politics, it can sometimes be more useful initially to ask not whether an action is good or bad, but: What does this action achieve?

Seen this way, General Muhoozi Kainerugaba's recent behaviour deserves examination beyond the outrage it often produces.

There is little doubt that Muhoozi is accumulating power.

He is Chief of Defence Forces. He chairs the Patriotic League of Uganda. He has publicly announced his intention to contest the presidency in 2031. Political and business figures are increasingly organising around him. Reuters describes him as having long been considered a potential successor to his father.

More interestingly, he seems willing to break some of the cosy arrangements that developed during four decades of Museveni's rule.

Museveni's political genius has never simply been coercion. It has also been accommodation.

He brought opponents inside. He balanced factions. He allowed competing networks of influence to coexist beneath his ultimate authority. An opponent today could become a minister tomorrow. A businessman in trouble might know somebody in State House. A politician quarrelling with one security agency might find protection through another power centre.

A political culture emerged in which virtually every important person knew another important person.

It worked.

"Museveni's longevity has been attributed by observers to strategic patience, shifting alliances and firm control of the military alongside his ability to manage competing interests...

An urban political and business elite flourished inside this arrangement.

And this may explain why parts of that elite look so uncomfortable with Muhoozi.

Consider the range.

Kizza Besigye is a former Museveni physician and NRM insider turned opposition leader.

Erias Lukwago is one of Kampala's most established political figures.

Odrek Rwabwogo is not merely a businessman and presidential adviser. He is Museveni's son-in-law.

Anita Among rose to become Speaker of Parliament.

Yet proximity, title and establishment credentials increasingly appear incapable of guaranteeing insulation from Muhoozi.

Following Lukwago's detention, The Observer reported extraordinary reluctance among senior politicians and civil-society leaders to comment publicly. One unnamed NRM legislator told the newspaper that politicians had realised Muhoozi was not bluffing.

"That is an important characteristic of power.

Its highest expression is not when you continuously punish people. It is when people adjust their behaviour because they believe you might...

Then came the almost comic spectacle surrounding a reported celebration for Among.

State Minister Justine Nameere Nsubuga hurried to distance herself from suggestions that she was organising it. The significance was not the party. It was the political body language.

In the old order, powerful people negotiated around one another.

In the emerging order, people appear increasingly careful not even to be mistaken for standing in the wrong place.

That tells us something.

"But what may shock Uganda's traditional elite even more is the apparent absence of widespread public sympathy for its discomfort...

This needs qualification. Opposition politicians, lawyers, human-rights activists and others have certainly spoken against arrests, detention and abuses of due process.

But there has been no obvious national popular mobilisation demanding protection of the old political establishment.

And absence of sympathy does not necessarily mean approval of Muhoozi.

It may simply reflect public alienation from an elite that many Ugandans believe has prospered disproportionately during the last four decades.

For years ordinary citizens have watched politicians accumulate wealth, businessmen cultivate political connections and public servants live lives far removed from the people they administer.

Now some members of that establishment are discovering arbitrariness and asking the country to be alarmed.

A Ugandan struggling to pay school fees might reasonably ask: When the system was working in your favour, where was your outrage?

Muhoozi may understand this instinctively.

Breaking elite networks can therefore serve two purposes simultaneously. It intimidates potential rivals while cultivating the image of a man unwilling to tolerate untouchable insiders.

The elite may call it persecution.

Sections of the public may see an overdue disruption of privilege.

Whether that perception is deserved is a different question. Due process remains due process. Breaking elite impunity is not the same thing as replacing institutions with personal discretion.

But there is an even larger complication.

What if Muhoozi himself is partly a red herring?

Everybody discussing succession—including those rapidly aligning themselves with Muhoozi—would be wise to remember that there remains one supreme practitioner of power in Uganda.

Yoweri Kaguta Museveni.

Museveni is a guerrilla before he is almost anything else politically.

The guerrilla survives through constant vigilance, constant movement and constant suspicion. He does not reveal his position unnecessarily. He keeps several escape routes open. He watches his comrades almost as carefully as his enemies. He allows an opponent to concentrate on one position while manoeuvring somewhere else.

Museveni's political career has repeatedly demonstrated patience, tactical flexibility and an ability to change alliances while retaining ultimate control. His major influence lie in a five-year guerrilla struggle in which mobility, political organisation, intelligence and careful preparation were indispensable.

And Museveni is not famous for telegraphing his intentions.

Which makes the apparent certainty around Muhoozi dangerous.

We have actually seen this movie before.

Ahead of the 2026 election, Muhoozi's presidential ambitions dominated political conversation. His political mobilisation accelerated. His supporters organised. Opponents debated the so-called Muhoozi Project endlessly.

As early as 2022, one remarkably prescient commentary proposed exactly the alternative theory: that Muhoozi might function as a decoy drawing political attention while Museveni quietly prepared for another presidential run.

That is essentially what happened.

Muhoozi had previously declared an intention to run, eventually withdrew, and Museveni returned to the ballot in January 2026 and secured another term.

So why assume 2031 is already settled?

Museveni could genuinely be preparing Muhoozi.

He could be testing him.

He could be allowing him to establish authority while observing which politicians rush to his camp.

He could be using Muhoozi to discipline an elite that Museveni himself cannot easily attack after decades of accumulated relationships.

He could be allowing two centres of power to develop so that every ambitious politician reveals his loyalties.

Or Muhoozi's ascendancy could once again be absorbing everybody's attention while Museveni keeps his own intentions deliberately obscure.

Several of these things could even be true simultaneously.

The guerrilla does not need the decoy to know that it is a decoy.

That is the genius of a good diversion.

Muhoozi can sincerely believe he is building his succession. His followers can genuinely believe they are joining the next administration. His adversaries can genuinely reorganise themselves to confront him.

And all of them can still be serving Museveni's interests.

Think what the current situation gives the President.

Politicians who believe Muhoozi is inevitable expose themselves by rushing towards him.

Those who oppose Muhoozi expose themselves too.

Businesspeople choose sides.

Old political relationships are broken.

The security establishment reveals where its loyalties lie.

Potential alternative successors either surface or retreat.

And Museveni gets to watch.

That is priceless intelligence for a man whose first political instincts were formed in guerrilla warfare.

It may therefore be premature to interpret Muhoozi's increasingly assertive conduct as proof that the succession has been settled.

Indeed, a 2026  examination of Museveni's new Cabinet specifically asked whether its composition might actually be putting brakes on Muhoozi's apparent ascension, illustrating how ambiguous the signals remain even inside government.

Muhoozi unquestionably matters.

His power is real.

His ability to frighten sections of the political class is real.

His network is growing.

His presidential ambition is now explicit.

But there is a difference between being powerful and being the successor.

And there is a difference between Museveni allowing something to happen and Museveni having decided how it will end.

At 81, after four decades in power and more than half a century immersed in politics, Museveni remains extraordinarily difficult to read. His political biography is one of adaptation: Marxist intellectual, guerrilla commander, revolutionary leader, liberal economic reformer, regional security partner and finally one of Africa's longest-serving presidents.

Survival has required constant adjustment.

So perhaps the most interesting question in Uganda today is not whether Muhoozi is demonstrating power.

Clearly he is.

The question is:

Whose power is ultimately being demonstrated?

His?

His father's?

Or both?

Uganda's elite may be scrambling to accommodate the man they believe will succeed Museveni.

They should remember one of the oldest rules of power.

Never declare the battle finished while the old guerrilla is still on the battlefield.

 

Tuesday, September 1, 2026

NRM’S BIGGEST SUCCESS MAY BE WHY THE YOUNG ARE ANGRY

One of the NRM’s biggest problems after 40 years in power is that some of its greatest achievements are being discounted precisely because they have lasted so long.

Give people an inch and, quite naturally, they will want a mile.

For much of Uganda’s first quarter-century after independence, the questions were painfully basic. Will I get home safely tonight? Will my property still be mine tomorrow? Will there be sugar, soap or salt in the shops? Will another coup or war overturn everything?

Today those questions sound almost absurd.

That, whatever else one thinks about the NRM, is part of its achievement.

Its two greatest legacies will probably be the restoration of security and the revival of an economy wrecked by political turmoil, economic mismanagement and war.

Younger Ugandans often roll their eyes when older people say: “At least we can sleep.”

It sounds like an embarrassingly low bar.

But those five words carry a deeper meaning.

People who lived in Kampala in the early 1980s remember a city that was often compared to Beirut: gunfire, curfews, roadblocks, armed men and the uncertainty of whether you would make it home.

So “at least we can sleep” is not really about bedtime...

It is shorthand for restored security.

And security underpins almost every economic gain we have made since.

You do not build factories, banks, hotels, telecom networks or supermarkets where property rights are meaningless and armed men can undo years of work in one afternoon.

Security was the foundation.

Everything else came on top of it.

But success resets expectations.

A Ugandan born in 2000 is not going to congratulate government because soldiers do not routinely drag people out of their homes at night.

Why should they?

Security is what governments are supposed to provide.

Their questions are different.

Where is my job? Why is housing unaffordable? Why am I still dependent on my parents after university? Why do connections sometimes seem to count for more than competence?

These are legitimate questions.

The same generational disconnect applies to liberalisation.

Many younger Ugandans do not realise how many things they now treat as basic were once privileges.

Take the telephone.

There was a time when getting a telephone line from Uganda Posts and Telecommunications Corporation could take years. You filled in forms, followed up repeatedly and hoped your application had not disappeared into the mountains of paperwork.

"Today there are more telephone users than there were Ugandans in 1986...

That is not a small transformation.

The same applies, to varying degrees, to electricity, banking and the internet. Goods and services once concentrated among government offices, big companies and a narrow urban elite are now accessible to millions.

None of this means access is universal or affordable enough.

It simply means progress happened.

And this is where the NRM’s next challenge lies.

"The gains of the last four decades will remain politically fragile if too many Ugandans believe they have been captured by a relatively small urban elite...

There is still much to achieve in narrowing disparities in wealth, income and opportunity.

For the urban graduate, frustration may mean a poorly paid job, expensive rent and the feeling that connections matter too much.

For the rural young person, it may mean poor roads, weak schools, limited access to finance, unreliable power and little realistic chance of moving from subsistence to wealth creation.

Economic growth is not enough if too many people remain spectators.

The next phase must therefore be about widening ownership of the gains already made.

More Ugandans need to own productive assets. More farmers need to move into commercial agriculture. More small businesses need to become medium-sized businesses. More households need access to good education, affordable credit, reliable electricity and functioning markets.

The question can no longer simply be whether Uganda is richer than it was in 1986.

The question is how widely that prosperity is shared.

There is, however, another danger: assuming all this progress was inevitable.

It was not.

Countries can go backwards.

Economies can collapse.

Institutions can be destroyed far faster than they are built.

"One symptom of our fading historical memory is the growing revisionism around Idi Amin, especially the claim that expelling Asians in 1972 was some heroic act of economic nationalism...

It was not.

The expulsion removed people who had accumulated commercial knowledge, capital, supplier relationships and management experience over generations and handed businesses to politically favoured beneficiaries, many of whom had neither built them nor knew how to run them.

Factories collapsed. Shops emptied. Supply chains broke.

Ironically, Asians later returned and are today, once again, among the main drivers of Uganda’s commercial and industrial life.

There is a lesson there.

Capital is not created by confiscation.

Entrepreneurial ability cannot be transferred by presidential decree.

"Prosperity cannot be redistributed before somebody creates it...

A generation that never experienced the destruction can afford to romanticise it.

History without memory easily becomes mythology.

None of this gives the NRM a permanent pass.

Forty years later, telling a 25-year-old that things are better than they were in 1986 is not an economic programme.

"Young Ugandans are right to demand the mile.

But they should also understand how we got the inch...

The NRM should not expect eternal gratitude for restoring security and rebuilding the economy. Equally, younger Ugandans should resist the idea that today’s relative stability and abundance simply happened.

They were built.

And they can be destroyed.

The real task now is to preserve the foundations while making sure the prosperity built on them spreads beyond Kampala, beyond the politically connected and beyond the already comfortable.

Because “at least we can sleep” should not be the end of Uganda’s ambition.

But neither should we forget why, once upon a time, being able to sleep was an achievement.

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