UGANDA BUDGET 2026/27: MATIA KASAIJA'S REPORT CARD

Matia Kasaija did not read last week’s budget for the first time in a decade. Arguably Uganda’s most colourful finance minister in his presentation, seen by his permanent place on social media, the achievements of his tenure may be lost in the humour.

When in thiscolumn I wrote about labour productivity in 2011, Uganda's challenge seemed straightforward.

We were working hard but producing too little.

The argument then was that Uganda's poverty was not primarily a result of laziness. Rather, our workers lacked the capital, technology, skills and organisational support needed to turn effort into output. A farmer with a hand hoe could work from sunrise to sunset and still produce less than a mechanised farmer elsewhere. Productivity, not effort, was the missing ingredient.

Fifteen years later, and ten years after Matia Kasaija became Minister of Finance, we have enough distance to ask a simple question:

Did Uganda solve the productivity problem?

The answer is both yes and no.

The "yes" is impressive.

When Kasaija took office in 2016, Uganda's economy was worth roughly $27 billion. Today it is approaching $70 billion. Domestic revenues have risen from about Shs11 trillion to more than Shs45 trillion projected in the latest budget. Exports have grown dramatically, from around $4 billion annually to well over $13 billion. Electricity generation has expanded. Roads have improved. Financial inclusion has deepened. Mobile money has transformed commerce. The tax-to-GDP ratio is projected to rise to 15.9 percent.

By almost any macroeconomic measure, Uganda is a bigger, more sophisticated economy than the one Kasaija inherited.

More importantly, the latest budget demonstrates a clear understanding that growth alone is not enough.

The emphasis on commercial agriculture, tourism, minerals, science and technology reflects an appreciation that the next phase of development is about raising productivity within sectors where Uganda enjoys competitive advantages.

In many ways, the latest budget reads like a practical application of the argument this column made in 2011.

Productivity creates wealth. Wealth creates revenues.Revenues create fiscal independence.

The projected 28 percent jump in domestic revenues is therefore more than a tax story. It is evidence that larger sections of the economy are becoming monetised and productive.

That is the good news.

The less flattering part of Kasaija's report card is that Uganda has not fully translated economic growth into economic transformation.

The most obvious evidence is that the same productivity questions raised in 2011 remain relevant in 2026.

Nearly three quarters of Ugandans still derive their livelihoods directly or indirectly from agriculture. Yet most remain smallholder farmers operating on tiny plots with limited mechanisation, weak market access and low productivity.

The economy has grown.

The average farmer has not transformed at the same pace.

This is why government now talks endlessly about agro-industrialisation, value addition and commercialisation. These are not new ideas. They are admissions that the productivity challenge remains unfinished.

Even more revealing is what the latest budget does not say.

The loudest silence remains domestic arrears.

A government genuinely focused on productivity would view unpaid suppliers as an economic emergency...

When a contractor waits years for payment, capital is trapped. Businesses borrow expensively to survive. Banks inherit bad loans. Investment slows. Jobs disappear.

Productivity is not only about producing more.

It is also about ensuring resources circulate efficiently through the economy.

In that regard, domestic arrears represent a major productivity failure.

The contradiction is striking.

Government wants farmers to produce more.

It wants manufacturers to expand.

It wants SMEs to create jobs.

Yet it simultaneously withholds liquidity from businesses that have already delivered goods and services.

That undermines the very productivity gains government seeks to achieve.

The second unresolved challenge is corruption.

Again, viewed through the productivity lens, corruption is not primarily a moral problem.

It is an economic problem.

Resources that should finance investment are diverted into consumption. Talent is redirected from productive activity into rent-seeking. Capital is allocated based on connections rather than efficiency.

The result is lower national productivity.

One of the most encouraging aspects of the latest budget is its recognition that revenue growth cannot indefinitely come from squeezing the same taxpayers. The PAYE threshold adjustment, though modest, signals an appreciation that economic growth ultimately depends on households and businesses retaining enough resources to remain productive.

The Treasury will forgo about Shs96 billion in revenue.

That is a small price to pay for acknowledging economic reality.

If there is one lesson from Kasaija's decade, it is that infrastructure was the easy part.

Roads can be built. Dams can be commissioned. Power lines can be erected.

Transforming behaviour is much harder.

The next stage requires changing how farmers farm, how businesses compete, how government spends and how institutions function.

That is a more complicated challenge than pouring concrete.

So how should history judge Matia Kasaija?

As the minister who successfully managed Uganda's transition from a low-income economy dependent on aid towards a more self-financing and increasingly diversified economy...

But also as the minister whose tenure ended with the country's biggest challenge largely unchanged.

The productivity problem identified in 2011 has evolved but not disappeared.

Uganda has become richer. Government has become bigger. Revenue collections have become stronger. Exports have become more diversified.

Yet the central question remains remarkably familiar:

How do we help millions of Ugandans produce more value from the same effort?

The latest budget suggests government finally understands that this is the question that matters....

Whether it can answer it will determine not only the legacy of Kasaija's successors, but whether Uganda finally makes the leap from growth to transformation.

That, more than any revenue target or expenditure figure, is the real test of the next decade.

THE UGANDA BUDGET'S LOUDEST SILENCE

The headline numbers in Uganda's 2026/27 budget are impressive.

The economy is projected to grow by 10.2 percent as oil production comes on stream. Domestic revenues are expected to rise by 28 percent from Shs35.7 trillion to Shs45.6 trillion, lifting the tax-to-GDP ratio to 15.9 percent. Exports continue to grow, inflation remains under control and government is talking confidently about accelerating the journey towards a $500 billion economy.

On the surface, there is much to celebrate.

Yet buried deep in the budget documents is a silence so loud it threatens to drown out all the optimism.

Domestic arrears.

The budget allocates Shs317 billion towards domestic arrears in the coming financial year, maybe we should be grateful that it is higher than last year’s sh200b. What it does not tell Ugandans is perhaps even more important: how much government actually owes.

That omission matters.

Any businessman seeking a loan would be expected to disclose his liabilities before discussing his repayment plan. Yet government has told taxpayers how much it intends to pay without disclosing the size of the outstanding bill.

The latest figure publicly cited by Parliament's Finance Committee, drawing on findings of the Auditor General, placed domestic arrears at more than Shs13.8 trillion.

If that figure remains broadly accurate, the Shs317 billion allocation would clear barely 2.3 percent of the stock.

Put differently, government is allocating forty-four times more money to domestic debt refinancing than it is to paying businesses and individuals who have already delivered goods and services to the state.

The contrast is startling.

Domestic debt refinancing will consume Shs13.97 trillion.

Interest payments will absorb another Shs14.11 trillion.

Together, debt-related obligations exceed Shs32 trillion.

Domestic arrears receive Shs317 billion.

From a financial perspective, one understands the logic. Government cannot afford to default on its debt obligations.

From an economic perspective, however, the consequences are profound.

For many businesses, government is their biggest customer.

Contractors build roads. Suppliers deliver medicines, stationery and equipment. Consultants provide services. Landlords rent premises.

Then the waiting begins. Months become years. Loans become non-performing. Interest accumulates. Cash flows collapse. Some businesses survive. Many do not.

In effect, domestic arrears amount to an invisible tax on the private sector. Government collects taxes on time but often pays its bills late.

The irony is that this directly undermines many of the objectives highlighted elsewhere in the budget.

Government is spending trillions through the Parish Development Model, Emyooga, the Agricultural Credit Facility, the Small Business Fund and Uganda Development Bank to support enterprise development.

Yet many businesses are being starved of liquidity simply because government has not paid for goods and services already received.

A supplier owed Shs1 billion by government does not need another government loan.

He needs his money.

Which brings us to corruption.

The budget deserves credit for placing anti-corruption efforts at the centre of its implementation reforms. Procurement reforms, digitisation, stronger audits, accountability charters for accounting officers and tighter oversight are all welcome measures.

The recent willingness by the state to confront high-level corruption allegations is also encouraging.

Uganda has reached a point where corruption is no longer merely a moral issue.

It is an economic threat.

As argued in this column before, corruption's greatest danger is not the money stolen.

Its greatest danger is the perception of unfairness it creates.

History shows that people can endure hardship for long periods. What they struggle to accept is a system that appears rigged.

The French Revolution was as much about inequality and privilege as it was about economics. The Arab Spring similarly reflected growing frustration with systems perceived as benefiting a small elite at the expense of everyone else.

The warning remains relevant.

When corruption becomes widespread, it begins to warp society's moral compass.

The discussion has ceased to be whether public resources were stolen. The discussion has become whether too much was stolen.

That is a dangerous place for any country to find itself.

Yet corruption does not exist in isolation.

Domestic arrears are one of the conditions that allow it to thrive.

Whenever payment depends on navigating a maze of approvals and signatures, opportunities emerge for influence peddlers, middlemen and rent-seekers.

A contractor who has waited two years for payment becomes vulnerable to anyone promising to "help" move a file. Domestic arrears are corruption's quieter cousin.

They create incentives for exactly the kind of behaviour government says it wants to eliminate.

That is why a serious anti-corruption agenda should include more than arrests, investigations and procurement reforms.

It should also include radical transparency around domestic arrears.

Government should publish the full stock of verified arrears.

It should explain how they accumulated.

And it should present a credible timetable for eliminating them.

Uganda's achievements over the last four decades are undeniable.

The challenge today is no longer simply growing the economy. The challenge is improving the quality of growth.

That means ensuring fairness. It means honouring obligations. It means reducing opportunities for corruption before they arise.

And it means recognising that confidence in government is built not only by collecting taxes and making promises, but also by paying bills.

The 2026/27 budget makes a strong statement about fighting corruption.

Its silence on domestic arrears is deafening.

And until that silence is addressed, the fight against corruption will remain only half complete.

A TAX CUT, A REVENUE BOOM AND UGANDA'S MARCH TOWARDS SELF-RELIANCE

There was a line in this year’s Budget Speech that deserved far more attention than the usual debate about roads, oil, industrial parks and public spending.

Domestic revenue is projected to jump from Shs35.7 trillion this financial year to Shs45.6 trillion in FY2026/27, an increase of nearly 28 percent. Even more importantly, Uganda’s tax-to-GDP ratio will rise to 15.9 percent.

At first glance, it sounds like just another budget statistic.

It is not.

It may well be one of the most significant economic milestones in Uganda’s recent history.

For decades, Uganda has been building the foundations of economic growth. Since the late 1980s, the economy has expanded more than tenfold. Tax revenues have grown more than sixtyfold. Exports have diversified from coffee and a handful of commodities into gold, manufactured products, fish, cocoa and services. The country has liberalised its economy, tamed inflation and built critical infrastructure.

Yet despite all this progress, Uganda has often struggled with one persistent challenge: raising enough domestic resources to finance its ambitions.

The consequence has been dependence on borrowing and, historically, donor support.

That is why Finance Minister Henry Musasizi’s revelation that domestic revenues funded 80.9 percent of the discretionary budget this year is so important. Uganda is steadily moving towards financing its development from its own resources.

"The minister correctly described domestic revenue mobilisation not merely as a fiscal objective but as a sovereignty objective...

He is right.

A country that pays its own bills enjoys greater policy independence than one dependent on lenders and donors.

The generation that lived through the Structural Adjustment Programmes remembers that economic assistance often came with conditions. Many of those reforms proved beneficial, but the lesson remains the same: when someone else finances your priorities, they inevitably influence them.

When you finance your own development, you retain the freedom to chart your own course.

That is why the projected 28 percent jump in domestic revenue matters.

Yet perhaps the most politically significant measure in the entire budget was not the revenue target.

It was the decision to increase the Pay As You Earn (PAYE) threshold for the first time in more than three decades...

For years, Ugandan workers have quietly borne the burden of what economists call fiscal drag. Salaries increased, prices increased and inflation steadily eroded purchasing power, but the tax-free income threshold remained frozen in time.

Workers found themselves paying more tax even when their real incomes had barely improved.

The government has finally acknowledged that reality.

The increase in the PAYE threshold is long overdue.

It means workers will retain more of what they earn. It provides additional spending power for households grappling with school fees, rent, healthcare costs and transport expenses.

In practical terms, the change amounts to a salary increase.

A worker who was previously paying tax on the first Shs500,000 of monthly income will now retain an additional Shs30,000 every month because that portion of income is no longer taxed. Effectively, government has delivered a Shs30,000 monthly pay rise to many formally employed Ugandans without requiring employers to increase wages.

Over a year, that translates into Shs360,000.

The Treasury estimates that the measure will cost about Shs96 billion in foregone revenue. But that is a small price to pay for a reform that was overdue by more than three decades. In truth, the adjustment could—and arguably should—have been larger. Inflation has steadily eroded the value of the original threshold over the years. Had the tax-free band been adjusted periodically to reflect changes in the cost of living, today's threshold would likely be significantly higher.

Yet the symbolism matters. Government is effectively sharing some of the gains from stronger revenue performance with taxpayers. At a time when domestic revenues are projected to grow by nearly Shs10 trillion, foregoing Shs96 billion to provide relief to workers represents less than one percent of the additional revenue being raised. It is a modest concession, but a welcome one.

More importantly, it signals a welcome shift in thinking.

"The purpose of taxation is not to maximise taxes. The purpose is to maximise economic activity...

A growing economy ultimately generates more revenue than an overtaxed one.

That is one reason this budget deserves credit for focusing more on expanding the tax base than imposing new taxes.

The distinction is critical.

For too long, Uganda’s tax debate has focused on how much more government can collect from the same formal-sector taxpayers.

Yet the formal economy remains relatively small.

Millions of Ugandans remain outside the tax net, not because they are evading taxes, but because their economic activity remains informal, subsistence-based or too small to tax effectively.

The answer is not squeezing existing taxpayers harder.

The answer is monetisation.

That is precisely why the budget theme remains focused on commercial agriculture, industrialisation, expanding services, digital transformation and market access.

The logic is straightforward.

A subsistence farmer generates little taxable activity because little income enters the formal economy.

A commercial farmer purchasing inputs, accessing finance, processing produce and selling into organised markets creates taxable economic activity throughout the value chain.

The same applies to manufacturing, tourism, ICT, logistics and financial services.

This is where the budget’s emphasis on the ATMS sectors—agro-industrialisation, tourism, minerals and science, technology and innovation—becomes important. These are not merely spending priorities. They are future tax bases. They are the engines that will generate the jobs, incomes and enterprise growth necessary to sustain higher revenues without imposing higher tax rates.

The challenge now is to maintain momentum.

A tax-to-GDP ratio of 15.9 percent represents significant progress, but it remains below the levels achieved by many countries that successfully transitioned from low-income to middle-income status. Most sustain tax ratios above 20 percent.

Uganda still has ground to cover.

Fortunately, technology is making that journey easier.

The rapid growth of digital payments, e-invoicing, mobile money and integrated government databases offers opportunities to broaden compliance while reducing the cost of collection. The ideal tax system is one where paying taxes becomes seamless rather than adversarial.

There is another reason why stronger domestic revenue mobilisation matters today.

Uganda stands on the threshold of commercial oil production.

Many resource-rich countries have made the mistake of becoming dependent on oil revenues while neglecting their domestic tax systems.

The wiser approach is the one this budget appears to embrace: build a strong domestic revenue base first and treat oil revenues as an accelerator rather than a substitute.

Oil wells eventually run dry.

A productive economy driven by farmers, entrepreneurs, manufacturers, innovators and exporters can sustain prosperity indefinitely.

Ultimately, the most important story in this budget is not the size of expenditure, the roads being built or even the coming oil revenues.

It is a subtle but profound shift in philosophy.

For much of the last four decades, Uganda’s economic story was about stabilisation, liberalisation and growth.

The next chapter is about transformation.

Transformation requires resources.

Resources require production.

Production requires people participating fully in the money economy.

That is why the jump in domestic revenues and the increase in the PAYE threshold are two sides of the same coin.

One reflects a government becoming financially stronger.

The other reflects citizens being given a little more room to breathe.

A successful economy requires both.

As the new cabinet settles into office and implementation of the NRM manifesto begins, the real work starts now. As the budget itself notes, Uganda’s challenge is no longer merely growing the economy. The challenge is ensuring that growth translates into jobs, enterprise development, rising household incomes and prosperity for ordinary Ugandans.

If Uganda can continue expanding its revenue base while simultaneously improving the lives of its citizens, this year’s budget may be remembered not for how much government spent, but for how much closer the country came to paying for its own future.

THE BUSINESS CASE FOR ARSENAL'S RETURN TO THE SUMMIT

The skying of Gabriel’s penalty in the finals of the Champion’s League final last weekend should not detract from a greater business story surrounding the return of Arsenal to the summit of European soccer.

Arsenal's return is often explained through the lens of Mikel Arteta's managerial brilliance, smart recruitment, and a talented young squad. All of that is true.

But the deeper story began nearly three decades ago when Arsenal made a decision that would fundamentally reshape the club's future: leaving their old home Highbury and building the Emirates Stadium.

What Arsenal are enjoying today is the payoff from a long-term investment whose benefits took almost twenty years to fully materialize. It is a story of delayed gratification, strategic patience, and enduring short-term pain for long-term gain.

It is also a story with important lessons for Uganda.

The Highbury Problem

By the late 1990s Arsenal were among Europe's elite clubs. Under Arsène Wenger, they won league titles in 1998, 2002 and 2004, including the famous Invincibles season.

Yet beneath the success lay a structural weakness.

Highbury, though iconic, held only about 38,000 spectators. Arsenal simply could not generate the revenues of rivals such as Manchester United, whose Old Trafford accommodated more than 67,000 fans. Football was becoming increasingly commercialized, and financial strength was becoming as important as footballing excellence.

Arsenal faced a choice: preserve the romance of Highbury or build a platform for future growth.

They chose growth.

Paying for the Future

The Emirates Stadium was one of the biggest infrastructure projects ever undertaken by a football club.

The move transformed Arsenal's business. Matchday revenues more than doubled, rising from roughly £35-40 million (sh200b) annually at Highbury to more than £90 million after the move. Commercial opportunities expanded dramatically while the club's global profile grew.

The numbers tell the story. Around the time Arsenal committed to the Emirates project, the club's enterprise value was estimated at less than £500 million (about sh2.5 trillion). Annual revenues hovered around £100-140 million.

Today Arsenal generate nearly £700 million in annual revenues and are valued at approximately £2.5 billion. In dollar terms, the club's valuation has risen from roughly US$500 million in the early Emirates era to more than US$3.4 billion today.

In other words, Arsenal's value has increased more than five-fold while revenues have expanded by a similar magnitude. The trophies may have disappeared for long stretches, but value creation did not. The club was quietly transforming itself from a successful football team into one of the world's most valuable sporting institutions.

But none of this came cheaply.

The stadium had to be financed. Debt had to be serviced. Costs had to be controlled.

And the burden fell largely on Wenger.

Wenger's Hidden Achievement

History remembers Wenger for the Invincibles. Yet his greatest contribution may have come after the trophies.

While Chelsea benefited from Roman Abramovich's billions and Manchester City later enjoyed Abu Dhabi's vast wealth, Arsenal were effectively paying a mortgage.

Transfer spending was constrained. Wage bills were tightly managed. Star players departed. Thierry Henry, Cesc Fàbregas, Samir Nasri and Robin van Persie all left during this period.

Supporters interpreted these departures as a lack of ambition.

The reality was that Arsenal were building tomorrow while trying not to lose today.

Wenger managed one of football's most difficult balancing acts. Between 1998 and 2016 Arsenal qualified for the Champions League every season. Those appearances generated crucial revenues that helped sustain the club during the Emirates years.

The famous jokes about Arsenal repeatedly finishing fourth overlooked an important truth: fourth place was helping pay for the stadium.

What looked like stagnation was actually strategic endurance.

Two Steps Forward, Three Steps Back

For much of the Emirates era Arsenal appeared trapped in a cycle of two steps forward and three steps back.

The club would develop a promising team only to lose key players. Rivals seemed to move ahead faster. Supporters became increasingly impatient.

Yet beneath the surface, the fundamentals were improving.

The debt burden was shrinking relative to revenues. Commercial income was growing. Arsenal's global reach was expanding. Most importantly, the club's enterprise value was compounding.

This is perhaps Wenger's most underrated legacy. He helped oversee a period in which Arsenal's value increased by billions of pounds despite operating with a budget smaller than many rivals. The football may not always have reflected progress, but the business certainly did.

The trophies arrived much later than fans expected.

The value creation arrived first.

Today Arteta is harvesting crops planted long before his arrival.

The lesson? Transformative investments rarely produce immediate results. Often they make things harder before they make things better.

Uganda's Arsenal Moment

The parallel with Uganda is difficult to ignore.

Over the last four decades Uganda has averaged roughly 6 percent annual economic growth. GDP has expanded more than tenfold. Tax revenues have risen more than sixty-fold. Infrastructure has improved dramatically. Exports have diversified from a handful of agricultural commodities into a much broader basket.

Yet, like Arsenal at Highbury, Uganda may be approaching the limits of what its current model can deliver.

The next leap will require bigger bets.

Infrastructure investments in energy, transport and logistics. Human capital investments in education, healthcare, science and technology. The creation of new markets in agro-industrialization, mineral beneficiation, financial services, tourism and digital services.

Some of these investments will initially feel like Arsenal's Emirates years. Resources will be stretched. Returns may appear disappointing. Progress may seem frustratingly slow.

There will be moments when it feels like two steps forward and three steps back.

But Arsenal's story reminds us that the most important investments are often invisible at first. The stadium looked like a burden before it became an advantage. The debt looked like a constraint before it became a platform for growth. The sacrifice looked like stagnation before it became success.

The challenge for Uganda is not whether it can continue growing. It is whether it has the discipline (no corruption), patience and courage to make the long-term investments necessary to move from growth to transformation.

Arsenal's return to the summit was not built in a season. It was built over twenty years.

That is perhaps the important business lesson.

UGANDA’S NEXT ECONOMIC FRONTIER

A few years ago, I was chatting with a businessman returning from Asia. He told me something that has stayed with me ever since. “The difference between us and them,” he said, “is that over there everybody seems to be trying to produce something. Here, too many people are trying to position themselves between the producer and the customer.”

That observation neatly captures Uganda’s next economic challenge.

This year marks 40 years since the NRM took power in 1986. Whatever one’s politics, the scale of economic transformation during that period is undeniable. Uganda’s economy has grown more than ten-fold. Tax revenues have increased roughly 60-fold. Inflation was tamed, foreign exchange shortages disappeared and sectors like telecommunications, digital payments and modern financial services emerged.

"The liberalisation of the economy fundamentally altered Uganda’s trajectory. It unleashed private initiative, attracted foreign investment and diversified exports beyond coffee and cotton into fish, flowers, gold, cement, steel products and regional trade services.

Forty years ago Uganda was largely surviving. Today it is functioning.

But the next challenge is no longer recovery. It is transformation — ensuring the gains of growth are distributed more equitably, mainly that productive sectors create millions of jobs, especially for young people.

With the announcement of the new Cabinet, the real work now starts.

The first and most urgent challenge is corruption.

"For years corruption served a political utility function, helping maintain patronage networks and political coalitions. But like all political tools, there comes a point when the side effects outweigh the benefits.

That point may well have arrived.

Corruption is now an economic threat. It distorts incentives, reallocates capital from productive enterprise to political rent-seeking and deepens wealth inequalities in socially dangerous ways. Young people stop admiring entrepreneurs and instead admire brokers and politically connected dealmakers. Economic energy shifts from creation to extraction.

No country develops sustainably that way.

The second challenge is improving the business environment so that incentives sit squarely with producers rather than commission agents and rent seekers.

At the heart of every prosperous country is a simple formula: production must pay better than speculation.

A farmer who grows maize should earn more than the broker standing between the farmer and the market. A manufacturer should thrive more than a politically connected importer gaming procurement systems.

But too often in Uganda, the opposite happens.

The productive economy carries the tax burden while rent-seeking flourishes in the shadows. Businesses spend too much time navigating bureaucracy, delayed government payments and regulatory overlap instead of expanding production.

Uganda also needs clarity about how government intervenes in the economy.

East Asian economies did not subsidise businesses indiscriminately. Governments strategically backed firms capable of competing in export markets and generating foreign exchange. Support was tied to performance and competitiveness.

By contrast, many import substitution schemes in Africa degenerated into protection rackets for politically connected businesses. Shielded from competition, such firms became financial black holes enriching a few cronies at the expense of taxpayers and consumers.

Government intervention should therefore focus on unlocking Uganda’s genuine competitive advantages.

Agriculture remains the clearest example. Uganda has fertile soils, good climate and abundant labour. The goal should not merely be producing raw commodities but building globally competitive agro-processing industries.

Tourism is another underexploited goldmine. Few countries combine Uganda’s biodiversity and climate in such a compact geography. Yet tourism still performs below potential because of weak infrastructure and fragmented value chains.

Education and health services could position Uganda as a regional hub if quality improves. Logistics and financial services naturally position Uganda as a gateway to the Great Lakes region, while mining should support industrialisation rather than simply exporting raw minerals.

The third challenge is financing infrastructure sustainably through infrastructure bonds.

Uganda’s infrastructure deficit remains enormous. Roads, railways, irrigation systems and logistics networks require massive long-term financing. Yet excessive dependence on external borrowing exposes the country to exchange rate risks and rising global interest costs.

Uganda has quietly built pools of long-term savings through institutions like NSSF, insurance companies and pension schemes. Infrastructure bonds could channel these savings into productive national assets while deepening domestic capital markets.

Infrastructure is not consumption. It is economic oxygen.

The fourth challenge is guarding against the oil curse.

Oil has destroyed as many countries as it has enriched. The danger is not the oil itself but what oil revenues do to political and economic behaviour. Easy money can weaken tax discipline, fuel corruption and undermine agriculture and manufacturing competitiveness.

"Uganda must resist the temptation to consume oil revenues politically before investing them productively. The smartest oil economies use oil revenues to diversify away from oil.

Finally, agriculture.

Agriculture remains Uganda’s largest employer and perhaps its greatest untapped wealth creator. The real challenge now is mass job creation, and no sector can absorb labour at scale faster than agriculture linked to agro-processing, logistics, storage and export marketing.

For too long agriculture discussions have focused narrowly on production. But agriculture is a value chain, not merely farming. The real wealth often lies beyond the farm gate.

The first 40 years were about rebuilding a collapsed economy. The next phase must be about transforming a functioning economy into a broadly prosperous one.

Stability was the foundation. Transformation is now the mission.

THE GREAT REPOSITIONING: MUSEVENI TAKES BACK TOTAL CONTROL OF THE TRANSITION

The most interesting thing about President Yoweri Museveni’s latest cabinet reshuffle is not simply who was promoted or dropped, but what the changes reveal about the political moment Uganda has entered. These are not ordinary administrative adjustments. They increasingly look like positioning moves in a carefully managed transition process where the central question is no longer whether succession politics are underway, but how they are being choreographed — and who controls them.

One striking detail immediately stands out: 28 ministers did not return to cabinet. That is not cosmetic pruning. It is significant political surgery.

"The removal of such a large bloc of ministers signals a deliberate attempt to recentralise authority around Museveni himself after several years in which competing power centres had begun emerging within the ruling establishment. Most notably, the sidelining of Anita Among dramatically changes the internal balance of power.

For a while, Among had evolved from merely a parliamentary leader into a formidable political actor in her own right — building extensive patronage networks across MPs, cultivating financial leverage and increasingly appearing as an autonomous centre of political gravity. The recent corruption scandals surrounding Parliament, culminating in public outrage over elite excess, weakened that project considerably.

With Among politically wounded and many of her allies displaced, Museveni now appears firmly back in control of the transition process. The reshuffle feels partly like a reassertion of presidential authority over a ruling coalition that had started developing too many independent ambitions.

Why Alupo Suddenly Matters More

To understand the deeper logic of the reshuffle, one has to begin with an often-overlooked constitutional fact: under Uganda’s Constitution, the Vice President is the formal successor mechanism should the presidency unexpectedly fall vacant. That suddenly makes Vice President Jessica Alupo’s continued prominence politically interesting.

Alupo is not merely a civilian politician from Teso balancing regional arithmetic. She is also a retired Major in the UPDF and previously served in the Special Forces Command (SFC), the elite military unit over which Gen. Muhoozi Kainerugaba built his influence and from which much of Uganda’s contemporary military power structure has evolved. Muhoozi is now the Chief of Defence Forces (CDF), effectively sitting atop the country’s formal military hierarchy. 

In ordinary political times that detail might seem incidental. In transition politics it becomes enormously consequential.

It suggests that the formal constitutional succession line and the informal security architecture are increasingly being aligned rather than left to chance. In many African political systems, transitions become unstable when constitutional authority and security power centres diverge. Museveni appears determined to minimise that risk.

The Defence Ministry as Political Insurance

Kiryowa Kiwanuka’s move from Attorney General to Defence reinforces that interpretation.

Defence in Uganda is not merely a military docket. It is political insurance. Whoever controls the security architecture controls the pace and stability of any transition process. Kiryowa is not a bush-war historical figure or battlefield general. He is a corporate lawyer, politically disciplined and deeply embedded within the President’s inner trust networks.

Those trust networks themselves are revealing.

Kiryowa is law partner to Edwin Karugire, Museveni’s son-in-law, in one of Kampala’s influential legal practices. Their relationship stretches back decades. They were in the same class at King’s College Budo and later studied together at Makerere University’s law school — ties that speak to how Uganda’s ruling elite has long functioned through tightly knit educational, social and familial networks.

Kiryowa first came to national prominence as part of the legal team that defended Museveni’s contested 2001 electoral victory. In other words, his rise has long been intertwined with the regime’s political survival architecture itself. 

The Karugire connection goes even deeper historically. Edwin Karugire’s father, the late historian Prof. Samwiri Karugire, was one of western Uganda’s most influential intellectuals. Following his death, his children were in many ways absorbed into the extended Museveni family orbit. The relationship between the Karugires and the First Family is therefore not merely political. It is deeply personal, historical and generational.

Seen through that lens, Kiryowa’s appointment to Defence is less surprising. Museveni appears to be placing strategically sensitive institutions into the hands of people bound not simply by political loyalty, but by decades-long personal relationships forged through family, school, history and shared political battles.

That is classic transition-era behaviour.

Sam Mayanja and the Coming Legal Battles

Sam Mayanja’s appointment as Attorney General is equally revealing, though in a different way. Mayanja is intellectually combative, ideological and deeply invested in constitutional and historical debates. He is not a cautious technocrat. He is a political lawyer.

That may indicate government expects sharper legal and constitutional contests ahead — over elections, political settlements, land and perhaps even succession questions themselves.

Yet Mayanja’s temperament also introduces risk. Attorney General requires institutional restraint and legal steadiness. Mayanja thrives in ideological confrontation. In a politically sensitive period, that can either energise the regime intellectually or unnecessarily inflame tensions.

Ayebare, Kagame and the Rwanda Question

Adonia Ayebare’s appointment as Foreign Affairs minister may be the strongest technocratic choice in the reshuffle. Ayebare is internationally respected, diplomatically sophisticated and deeply networked within multilateral systems. 

Ayebare is also a former journalist, a background that gives him unusual communication instincts for diplomacy. He understands both narrative management and international perception — skills Uganda increasingly needs as succession politics intensify.

Equally important, Ayebare has historically maintained relatively good personal relations with Paul Kagame. That matters enormously given the simmering tensions between Kampala and Kigali over the last two decades.

Relations between the two countries effectively went to pieces in the Democratic Republic of Congo at the beginning of this century, where the former allies found themselves backing rival interests during the Congo wars. Although relations have improved recently, mistrust still lingers beneath the surface.

Ayebare’s appointment therefore appears designed not merely for global diplomacy, but also for regional stabilisation. He is likely to complement Muhoozi’s increasingly visible efforts to engineer détente with Kigali. Muhoozi himself has often projected unusually warm public messaging toward Rwanda and Kagame compared to the harder nationalist rhetoric that occasionally emerges elsewhere within Uganda’s establishment.

In that sense, Foreign Affairs may now become part of transition management too. Stable relations with Rwanda reduce one major external variable during a potentially delicate succession period.

Katumba’s Quietly Strategic Move

Then there is Gen. Katumba Wamala’s move from Works and Transport to Public Service. At first glance it looks like a demotion. Works is politically visible; Public Service is bureaucratic and low glamour.

But in transition periods, bureaucratic control becomes critical.

Public Service determines appointments, promotions and administrative discipline across the state. Katumba’s reputation as a calm, loyal stabiliser trusted across military and civilian divides may make him particularly useful in keeping the state machinery cohesive during an uncertain political period.

Museveni the Guerrilla Still Keeps Us Guessing

Still, one must be careful not to overstate the certainty of these interpretations.

Museveni is, at his core, a guerrilla strategist. One of the defining characteristics of guerrilla warfare is deception — keeping opponents guessing, masking intentions, creating multiple centres of gravity and never fully revealing one’s endgame. Throughout his political career Museveni has shown an extraordinary ability to play his cards close to his chest, often allowing observers to confidently misread his intentions.

That means all these interpretations may ultimately prove to be sophisticated misdirection. The apparent alignment of constitutional succession, security structures and trusted family networks may be deliberate signalling — or deliberate distraction.

Museveni has survived politically precisely because he rarely moves in straight lines.

Yet even with that caveat, the reshuffle unmistakably suggests a leader thinking carefully about continuity, stability and regime preservation in an uncertain future. Whether by design or instinct, he appears to have covered most of the critical bases if something untoward were to happen tomorrow.

The constitutional line is secure. The military hierarchy is tightly aligned. Trusted loyalists sit atop strategic ministries. International diplomacy is in experienced hands. Bureaucratic management is under dependable figures.

The Opening Moves of Uganda’s Next Era

The broader signal from the reshuffle is therefore that Uganda’s political system is quietly reorganising itself around a future beyond Museveni while publicly insisting that no transition conversation exists. That contradiction is becoming harder to conceal.

This cabinet increasingly resembles a structure designed less for routine governance and more for continuity management — aligning constitutional succession mechanisms, security structures, diplomatic messaging and elite trust networks into a coherent political insurance framework.

The irony, however, is that transition management itself can accelerate transition pressures. Once elites begin positioning for a post-Museveni order, politics subtly changes. Loyalties become conditional. Bureaucracies become cautious. Security calculations become layered. International actors begin hedging their bets.

That may explain why this reshuffle feels less like the beginning of a new government term and more like the opening moves of Uganda’s next political era.

CORRUPTION CORRUPTS EVERYONE IT TOUCHES

One of the more sobering ways to understand corruption is to translate the numbers into human terms.

Last year, Mulago National Referral Hospital told Parliament that its Shs122 billion allocation was grossly inadequate to run the country's largest referral facility and fully operationalise critical units like intensive care. Recent hospital and research data indicate Mulago now handles roughly three million patient interactions annually. That means, very roughly, the hospital spends about Shs40,000 per patient encounter.

Now place that beside the roughly Shs28 billion reportedly discovered in currencies in properties linked to former Speaker Anita Among.

At Mulago's expenditure ratios, that amount alone could theoretically support treatment for about 700,000 patient visits – or the population of Isingiro district; or nearly triple the Shs10 billion the hospital said it urgently needed to fully operationalise its intensive care units...

But here is what the numbers alone cannot capture: corruption does not simply steal money. It corrupts everything it touches. The thief. The witness. The bystander. Eventually, the entire society.

That is the real danger.

It first corrupts the individual.

Once individuals accumulate extraordinary wealth through public office, losing power becomes existential. Retirement stops being an option because without continued access to the machinery of the state, sustaining those lifestyles becomes impossible. No employer in Uganda's economy pays enough to maintain convoys, mansions, entourages, luxury shopping and political patronage networks at that scale. Very few legitimate businesses generate such cash flows either.

So corruption mutates. What begins as theft becomes dependency. What begins as greed becomes survival. Office holders stop behaving like custodians of public institutions and begin behaving like shareholders protecting a revenue stream...

That perhaps explains reports that Anita Among briefly contemplated resisting directives to step aside as Speaker — reportedly exploring an independent political path before raids on homes and the freezing of accounts neutralised those ambitions. One almost understands the logic emotionally, even while rejecting it morally. When a person becomes accustomed to limitless facilitation and elite privilege, stepping away from office can feel economically catastrophic.

Corruption has, by that point, already corrupted the person entirely.

It then corrupts institutions.

As corruption deepens, loyalty shifts from institutions to networks of mutual protection. Politicians protect procurement officials. Procurement officials protect businesspeople. Security actors protect politicians. Everyone possesses compromising information about everyone else. The system survives less on legitimacy and more on shared vulnerability.

Public institutions — hospitals, Parliament, the judiciary stop functioning as instruments of national development and begin operating as platforms for elite extraction. The state does not disappear. It is simply repurposed.

But most insidiously, corruption corrupts the rest of us.

One of the most depressing features of recent public discussions around the Anita Among saga has been the language ordinary people casually use. "Let her eat, after all other people are eating." "Why was she eating all that alone?" "People just need to know when to stop eating."

Notice what has happened there. The debate is no longer whether stealing public resources is wrong. It has shifted to whether the sharing was equitable, or whether the appetite simply became too visible. Corruption has been normalised — treated as an unofficial entitlement of office. We have stopped measuring leaders against principles and begun measuring them against the hunger of those around them.

That is how corruption corrupts citizens. It lowers the moral floor so gradually that people barely notice they are standing somewhere they once would never have tolerated.

This matters because a society can survive inequality. What it cannot survive is inequality stripped of legitimacy. A businessman who builds factories and creates jobs may grow rich and still command public admiration. But wealth born of political office triggers deep resentment, because citizens instinctively understand that public office exists to protect the common good — not to serve as a private ATM.

History repeatedly confirms this. Societies rarely collapse simply because people are poor. They collapse when citizens become convinced that elites are enriching themselves obscenely while ordinary people cannot afford school fees, rent or hospital bills. The French Revolution was fuelled as much by the visible excess of the aristocracy as by poverty itself. The Arab Spring was driven not only by unemployment but by perceptions of corruption, exclusion and elite impunity.

Hopelessness is politically combustible. People eventually stop asking how to succeed within the system and begin asking whether the system itself deserves to survive.

Social media has sharpened this danger considerably. Lifestyles once hidden behind walls are now displayed in real time before frustrated citizens. The gap between what is flaunted and what is endured has never been more visible — or more volatile.

Uganda today is wealthier than it was 40 years ago. There are more banks, highways, telecom towers, malls and private fortunes than ever before. But development without fairness creates instability, because visible prosperity raises expectations. People can tolerate hardship. What they struggle to tolerate is humiliation.

And that is why the fight against corruption cannot be framed as merely a moral or financial issue. It is a question of what kind of society we are becoming. Every time we shrug at stolen billions. Every time we joke about who is "eating." Every time we measure a leader's wrongdoing against someone else's greed rather than against principle — corruption wins another convert.

Because that is precisely how corruption works. It does not only take the money.

It takes us with it.