THE FALL OF AMONG WAS NOT ABOUT CORRUPTION

After perhaps the most intense weekend of her life, Uganda’s Speaker of Parliament Anita Among announced that she would not put herself up for re-election as leader of the country’s legislature in the next Parliament.

The decision came after days of extraordinary political drama: armed security personnel surrounding her home, reports of billions of shillings discovered in dollars, euros and pounds, and mounting public outrage over her newly acquired Rolls Royce.

"In the end, it was the Rolls Royce that finally shifted Anita Among from controversial politician into symbol of elite excess...

The luxury vehicle, reportedly flown into Uganda brand new in January rather than imported second-hand like most luxury vehicles in the country, instantly became politically toxic. Depending on specification, a new Rolls-Royce Cullinan or comparable Rolls Royce model can retail between £350,000 and £450,000 before shipping, taxes and customisation — roughly Shs1.7 billion to Shs2.2 billion at current exchange rates, and potentially much higher once fully imported into Uganda.

In a country where many civil servants struggle to survive on monthly salaries below Shs1 million, the symbolism was devastating.

The subsequent raid merely completed the picture in the public mind.

And in politics, once the public mind settles, recovery becomes almost impossible.

Ironically, she seemed politically untouchable only weeks ago

What makes Among’s apparent fall even more startling is that she emerged from the recent election cycle looking politically stronger than almost anyone in the system except President Yoweri Museveni himself.

Unlike many senior politicians who spent months fighting for survival in their constituencies, Among appeared liberated from ordinary political anxieties. She was elected virtually unopposed and therefore free to crisscross the country shepherding Museveni’s campaign effort and consolidating influence inside the ruling establishment.

At the height of the campaign season, she projected the aura of a politician whose future looked secure, expansive and perhaps even ascendant.

Which is why the speed of her apparent political collapse has caught nearly everyone by surprise.

From indebted MPs to dangerously wealthy politicians

Back on September 9, 2012, in a Shillings & Cents commentary titled “Uganda: MP indebtedness compromising Parliament?” Shillings & Cents — Uganda: MP indebtedness compromising Parliament? (September 9, 2012), I argued that financial vulnerability weakens independent political judgement because politicians trapped by debt become captives of survival rather than servants of principle.

But there is an opposite side to that same coin: excessive accumulation can be just as politically dangerous as indebtedness.

Because wealth changes political incentives.

Ironically, the two realities may now have collided in spectacular fashion inside Parliament itself. For years, quiet whispers around Kampala’s political corridors have suggested that many MPs are indebted up to their eyeballs, not just to banks, but directly to powerful parliamentary figures including Anita Among and Deputy Speaker Thomas Tayebwa, who allegedly evolved into major lenders to legislators.

That matters politically.

Because debt creates dependency. A financially desperate MP is easier to influence, easier to mobilise and easier to discipline. In such an environment, political authority stops being purely institutional and increasingly becomes financial. Patronage then evolves from campaign support into a parallel credit system operating within the legislature itself.

Seen this way, the wealth allegations against Among are not just about personal excess. They potentially point to the emergence of an alternative internal power structure rooted not merely in constitutional office but in financial leverage over fellow politicians...

The coalition that may now be unravelling

But power built through financial patronage rarely operates alone. It inevitably creates a coalition — beneficiaries, loyalists, fixers and opportunists tied together not necessarily by ideology but by access, favours and mutual vulnerability.

Among appears to have cobbled together precisely such a coalition.

Many within it may never have fully understood what her ultimate political endgame was. Some may simply have been responding to immediate incentives: campaign financing, loans, committee influence, parliamentary protection or proximity to power. But once a system begins to suspect that such a coalition is evolving beyond patronage into an independent political centre of gravity, alarm bells inevitably begin ringing.

Which is why this process may still be in its early stages.

It would not be surprising if more politicians, brokers and parliamentary actors are quietly summoned by security agencies in the coming weeks — at best to explain their role within the broader network, at worst to help stitch Among up politically and legally...

Because elite political takedowns are rarely clean or isolated affairs. They often involve carefully dismantling the ecosystem around the principal target.

Yet therein also lies the regime’s dilemma.

The system must manage the process carefully because a genuinely unconstrained anti-corruption campaign could end up bringing down far more than a single political figure. Too many interests are interconnected. Too many careers, alliances and financial relationships overlap.

A serious, uncontrolled excavation of corruption at the highest levels could destabilise the very political edifice the state is trying to preserve.

And that carries potentially damning political consequences.

“Rich men get into politics to protect their wealth”

My father once told me something that sounded cynical at the time but has proved remarkably accurate over the years: “Rich men get into politics to protect their wealth.”

Not necessarily to create wealth. To protect it.

The moment wealth reaches a certain scale, politics stops being an arena of service and becomes a form of insurance. A shield. A guarantee against investigation, prosecution, confiscation or political extinction. That is why across the world, from oligarchies to fragile democracies, wealth and political power eventually begin circling each other like magnets.

In Uganda’s case, this intersection has become increasingly delicate because of the country’s unresolved succession question.

That is why the Anita Among story cannot simply be understood as an anti-corruption story. Corruption is merely the surface layer. The deeper issue is political consequence...

When an individual accumulates wealth at the scale now being alleged, especially while occupying the third most powerful office in the land, it inevitably creates political possibilities. Wealth brings networks. Networks bring influence. Influence breeds ambition, whether stated openly or quietly nurtured behind closed doors.

It would not be far-fetched to conclude that at some point, if she felt politically threatened or isolated, Among’s resources could eventually become the foundation for a play for higher office or, at the very least, a destabilising political faction.

The system gave her enough rope

Power in politics is rarely surrendered voluntarily. It is managed pre-emptively.

That is why the current developments feel less like spontaneous accountability and more like controlled political surgery.

The system appears to have given her enough rope to hang herself. The Rolls Royce became symbolic excess at a time when ordinary Ugandans are struggling with school fees, rent and taxes. The foreign currency allegations then transformed public irritation into moral outrage. She is now politically indefensible in the court of public opinion, which is perhaps the most important battlefield of all.

Was the Sovereignty Bill really about foreign influence?

But there is another intriguing layer to this story that may explain the hurried and controversial introduction of the Protection of Sovereignty Bill earlier this month, and the insistence that the 11th Parliament pass it as virtually its last order of business.

It seems inconceivable that such vast quantities of dollars, euros and pounds could have been accumulated purely through domestic circulation. Hard currency at that scale immediately raises uncomfortable questions about external linkages, foreign financial networks and possible international political interests. Whether those suspicions are true or not almost becomes secondary because in statecraft perception often matters as much as fact.

If the security establishment had reason to believe that foreign actors were cultivating relationships with ambitious political elites during a sensitive succession moment, then the Sovereignty Bill begins to look less random and more strategic.

Suddenly the urgency makes sense.

Suddenly the procedural flaws, the haste and the political pressure to pass it before the end of the parliamentary term begin to appear less like legislative incompetence and more like elite panic...

The state may have concluded that Uganda is entering the dangerous phase many countries face during leadership transitions: the point where internal elite competition starts attracting foreign interest and external influence operations.

History is full of such moments.

Foreign governments and interests rarely wait for transitions to happen before positioning themselves. They cultivate networks early, identify emerging centres of power and quietly build leverage. In fragile political environments, money often becomes the first instrument of influence.

Seen through that lens, the move against Among may not simply have been about corruption or even succession management. It may also have been about shutting down what the system perceived as an emerging node of political and possibly foreign-backed power before it fully matured.

Norbert Mao’s curious role

There is also the curious role played by Norbert Mao in recent weeks. His increasingly public positioning around the Speakership now looks less accidental and more tactical. In hindsight, Mao may have been deployed as a political red herring — a deliberate irritant designed to ruffle Among’s feathers, unsettle her camp and pressure her into strategic mistakes.

Politics often works this way. Direct confrontation is avoided until the target has been psychologically isolated, politically cornered and emotionally destabilised.

One suspects there may initially have been efforts to engineer a quiet exit — a negotiated stepping aside in exchange for dignity, protection and preservation of some political relevance. But if Among resisted such overtures, believing perhaps that her networks, resources and institutional position still gave her leverage, then the escalation we are now witnessing becomes easier to understand...

The result has been a political sideshow that increasingly feels choreographed but is far from over.

Because once elite conflicts spill into public view, they develop their own momentum. Rival factions emerge. Old grudges resurface. Opportunists circle. The public becomes emotionally invested. And institutions themselves can become theatres of political signalling.

The transition question lurking beneath everything

And timing matters.

These developments are unfolding immediately after Museveni’s swearing-in on May 12 and just before new cabinet and political appointments are expected. That cannot be accidental. Political transitions, especially long-managed ones, are rarely dramatic events announced in a single speech. They are often quiet processes involving the careful elimination of obstacles, rivals, uncertainties and centres of independent power.

In many ways, Among may have become the last major obstacle to what appears to be an attempt at constructing an orderly transition architecture behind closed doors...

Uganda’s political history teaches us that transitions are feared precisely because they can easily descend into elite fragmentation. The governing system therefore has every incentive to tightly control the process, neutralise unpredictable actors and ensure that succession happens within a carefully supervised framework.

Seen through that lens, the move against Among begins to make strategic sense.

Why nations fail

The irony, however, is that this entire saga also validates another warning I wrote about recently on August 18, 2024, in a Shillings & Cents commentary titled “Uganda, beware of Why Nations Fail” Shillings & Cents — Uganda, beware of Why Nations Fail (August 18, 2024), discussing Why Nations Fail.

Nations fail not simply because leaders steal. Many countries survive corruption for decades. Nations fail when institutions become too weak to regulate the ambitions of powerful individuals and when political systems become overly personalised.

When wealth accumulation becomes inseparable from state power, politics itself becomes a high-stakes survival game. Public office stops being about governance and becomes access to protection. Losing office then becomes existential.

That is where danger begins.

Because once political competition is no longer about ideas, competence or ideology but about protection of accumulated wealth, transitions become harder, more suspicious and potentially more unstable.

The real lesson

Ironically, the Among saga may therefore reveal both the strength and weakness of the current system simultaneously.

Its strength lies in demonstrating that no political figure, however powerful, is untouchable if the system decides otherwise.

Its weakness lies in the uncomfortable public realisation that wealth accumulation at the highest levels may have proceeded unchecked until political calculations shifted.

Ugandans should therefore resist the temptation to see this merely as entertainment or palace intrigue. It is actually a revealing window into how power is organised, managed and contested in modern Uganda.

And perhaps the biggest lesson is this: in political systems where wealth and power become too intertwined, the fall of powerful individuals is rarely about morality alone.

It is usually about timing.

SEVENTY-ONE PERCENT IN A HALF EMPTY ROOM

Uganda woke up after the 2026 presidential election to a familiar headline delivered with an unfamiliar undertone. Yoweri Museveni had won again, this time with roughly seventy-one percent of the vote. 

On paper, it looked like a commanding endorsement, a suggestion that the political clock had been turned back to the era of overwhelming victories. But elections, like markets, only reveal their truth when you read the fine print. The other number that mattered—quietly but profoundly was turnout, hovering around the low fifties. The victory was wide, but the room was half-empty.

What made this result unusual was not just the arithmetic. It was the tone struck at the very top. In his acceptance speech, Museveni himself called for an investigation into low voter turnout. That single line, almost an aside, was more revealing than the percentage printed on the results sheet. 

Incumbents who believe they are riding a wave of popular enthusiasm rarely ask why fewer people showed up. This one did. In doing so, Museveni inadvertently acknowledged what the numbers already suggest: that the story of 2026 is not simply about a dominant winner, but about a thinning electorate.

To understand how Uganda arrived at a seventy-one percent victory attended by barely half the voters, one needs to step back three decades and trace the long arc of participation and power. 

In 1996, the country’s first direct presidential election under the current constitutional order, Museveni secured about seventy-four percent with turnout close to three quarters of registered voters. Uganda was emerging from years of turmoil; politics felt new, consequential, and personal. The high margins of that era were anchored in mass participation. People showed up in large numbers because they believed the future was being actively shaped.

By 2001, Museveni was still dominant, just under seventy percent, but competition had arrived and with it a subtle shift in political psychology. Politics became contested rather than consensual. That tension sharpened in 2006 when Museveni dipped below sixty percent for the first time. The significance of that election was not that he nearly lost—he did not—but that he entered a phase where margins could no longer be taken for granted. From then on, victories would need to be managed.

The years that followed confirmed this new equilibrium. In 2011 Museveni rebounded into the high sixties, but turnout fell sharply. In 2016 and 2021 his share hovered around sixty percent, while participation remained stubbornly depressed. For roughly fifteen years, Uganda’s elections settled into a pattern of compressed dominance: the ruling party winning comfortably, but no longer expansively; the opposition energetic, but structurally constrained. 

This was the context into which Robert Kyagulanyi -- Bobi Wine burst onto the scene.

Bobi Wine did not just add another name to the ballot. He injected emotion, generational language, and cultural symbolism into opposition politics. For the first time in years, dissent felt youthful and immediate. 

Shillings & Cents noted early that this mattered deeply, but also cautioned that enthusiasm is not the same as organisation. Wine’s appeal resonated powerfully in urban centres and among young voters who felt excluded from economic progress. Yet Uganda remains predominantly rural, and rural politics is shaped less by symbolism than by networks, relationships, and pragmatic calculations. That terrain still favoured the ruling party.

The 2021 election illustrated both Wine’s breakthrough and its limits. The opposition achieved its strongest showing in years, and the ruling party suffered unexpected losses, particularly in Central Uganda, where the National Unity Platform made dramatic parliamentary inroads. The result fed a narrative that Museveni’s grip was loosening. 

But even then,

the column warned that votes are delivered not by momentum alone, but by sustained grassroots presence. The danger, left unaddressed, was that frustration could mutate into abstention rather than mobilisation.

By 2026, that danger had crystallised. Many voters simply did not turn up. Some were disillusioned by the aftermath of 2021, others intimidated or fatigued, others resigned to the belief that participation would not meaningfully alter outcomes. Abstention, in such a system, is not neutral. It redistributes power in favour of those with reliable bases. And reliability, in Uganda, sits squarely with the incumbent.

This is where the ruling party’s own reading of the results becomes important. The National Resistance Movement has claimed a statistical victory in Central Uganda in 2026, pointing to the recapture of constituencies lost in 2021 and a notable reduction in the number of MPs from the National Unity Platform. From the NRM’s perspective, this is evidence that the political tide has turned back in its favour, that the shock of 2021 has been absorbed and reversed.

Yet those gains need to be read alongside turnout figures. Winning back seats in a context of lower participation is not the same as reclaiming broad consent. It suggests that the ruling party’s machinery—its local networks, resources, and institutional presence proved more resilient than the opposition’s in a demobilised environment. The base held; the opposition’s softened.

This, ultimately, is Museveni’s most enduring political advantage: adaptability. In the 1990s, legitimacy flowed from mass participation and post-war recovery. In the 2000s, as challenges mounted, control tightened. In the 2010s, the system learned to manage margins rather than chase overwhelming approval. By the 2020s, the objective was endurance. Elections no longer needed to inspire; they needed to conclude predictably.

Museveni’s call for an investigation into low turnout sits squarely within this logic. It can be read as concern, but also as confidence. A system that wins comfortably even when half the electorate stays home is not under immediate threat. But it is also a system aware that thinning participation carries long-term risks. Markets formed on low volumes are stable until they are not. Politics built on shrinking turnout carries a similar fragility.

For the opposition, and particularly for the Bobi Wine tendency, the lesson is hard but clear. Charisma, outrage, and symbolism can open doors, but they do not keep them open. Politics remains an organisational exercise. Without patient investment in rural presence, voter protection, and turnout discipline, moments of anger will continue to flare brightly and then fade at the polling station.

Thirty years of Ugandan election data tell a story that is neither triumphalist nor apocalyptic. Museveni’s victories have grown less participatory even as they remain decisive. The opposition has grown louder even as its turnout machinery has struggled. The 2026 result—seventy-one percent in a half-empty room, captures that tension perfectly.

The warning embedded in the numbers is subtle but unmistakable. Dominance sustained by low participation is durable, but brittle. It holds until something compels the absent to return. When that happens, margins built in quiet rooms can change very quickly indeed.

UGANDA 2026: BETWEEN PROTECTING GAINS AND BETTING ON A RESET

Uganda heads into the 2026 polls with two frontrunners manifestos framing two very different economic agendas.

The ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM)of President Yoweri Museveni has staked its ground on Protecting the Gains. The National Unity Platform under Robert Kyagulanyi Ssentamu, Bobi Wine, is calling for A New Uganda Now.

The NRM’s document reads like a long ledger of growth. It starts in 1986 with a collapsed economy and the black market as the main avenue for trade, then traces the rise to a $66 billion economy today.

Museveni divides this journey into five neat phases—recovery, expansion, diversification, value addition, and entry into the knowledge economy. His promise is to push Uganda into the next phase, a $500 billion economy built not on raw exports but on processed goods, automobiles, vaccines, ICT, and a unified East African market. It is a story of continuity, of the same formula—peace, infrastructure, value addition, applied with consistency and patience.

The NUP manifesto is cast in a sharper, more urgent tone. It describes an economy weighed down by food insecurity affecting over half of households, debt that has climbed to sh116 trillion, and youth unemployment that leaves more than half of under-30s without work or training. It paints corruption as the single greatest threat to national progress, siphoning off ten trillion shillings a year.

The response is a reset: ten million jobs in the next decade, a nationwide school feeding program to fight hunger and boost agriculture, protection of land rights, and a strategy to harness the diaspora as a source of remittances, investment, and skills. Where the NRM offers continuity, the NUP offers rupture.

Yet when one reads more closely, there is an interesting admission embedded in the NUP document.

While railing against corruption and inequality, it does not dismiss the fact that Uganda has grown under NRM rule. It nods quietly to that reality but then moves quickly to the argument that growth has not been fairly shared. Its emphasis is less on how to grow the economy than on how to spread its fruits through aggressive social programs. School feeding, jobs targets, and land redistribution all speak to fairness, but they rest on an economy that still needs to be grown. How that growth will be engineered is the thinner part of the NUP story.

The NRM has the opposite problem. Growth is its strongest suit: roads, dams, and industrial parks are there to be seen. But it is weak on equity. The numbers show expansion, yet for many households the benefits remain out of reach. Income gaps persist, youth unemployment remains stubborn, and corruption continues to hollow out the very institutions meant to deliver services.

The manifesto leans heavily on the idea that growth will eventually trickle down, that if the economy is made bigger, distribution will take care of itself. But after nearly four decades, Ugandans are entitled to ask whether growth without fairness is enough.

The two documents thus circle the same dual challenge—how to grow and how to distribute, but approach it from opposite ends. The NRM promises to grow and assumes equity will follow; the NUP promises equity but is less convincing on how to sustain growth. Museveni’s vision is anchored in infrastructure and industry, betting that prosperity will eventually filter to the ordinary household. Kyagulanyi’s vision is anchored in social programs and redistribution, betting that equity will unlock growth by energising the population.

For the voter, the decision is not abstract.

It is about whether the boda rider in Kampala sees fuel prices ease, whether the farmer in Bushenyi gets a fairer price for bananas, whether the graduate in Gulu finds work, and whether the taxpayer in Mbale feels their shillings are not stolen but spent on schools and hospitals. Protecting the gains may feel safer, but it risks leaving too many behind. Resetting may feel fairer, but it risks overpromising on resources that may not exist.

The 2026 election, therefore, is not just about growth or equity, but about the uneasy balance between the two. NRM offers continuity in growth but is still learning the politics of distribution. NUP promises distribution but has not fully spelled out the mechanics of growth. Between protecting gains and betting on a reset lies Uganda’s contested path to prosperity—an old story retold, but one that each generation must decide anew.

WHEN POLITICS BECOMES THE RICHEST GAME IN TOWN

They say politics is a calling, but in Uganda it is clearly a business. The most lucrative one in town.

The just-concluded NRM primaries have reminded us, yet again, that this is not about service or sacrifice. It is about access to a salary of nearly thirty million shillings a month, before allowances, before mileage, before committee perks.

In a country where the majority scrape by on a few hundred thousand shillings a month, an MP sits in the top percentile of the top percentile of earners. It is no wonder, then, that contests for the party flag in the last three editions, look less like elections and more like battles for survival...

The stories that filtered out were not those of rallies and manifestos. They were tales of slaps — allegedly landing on no less than the Prime Minister Robinah Nabanja herself and the open defiance of the party’s Central Executive Committee.

It is tempting to dismiss this as political theatrics. But when you follow the money, it all makes sense. This is not about principle. It is about who gets to eat, and who must wait another five years outside the banquet hall.

Ugandans are too jaded to believe their politicians sacrifice for the good of the people.

And the spending is staggering. Rumour has it that some candidates for the NRM Central Executive Committee splashed billions on their campaigns.

One cannot help but wonder: what if those billions were spent on production instead of posters, handouts and hired crowds? A billion shillings properly invested in agro-processing could transform the fortunes of an entire county. It could build a small factory, employ hundreds, buy produce from farmers who today rot in poverty, and generate tax revenues for years to come. Instead, the billions vanish in days, leaving nothing behind but bitterness and unpaid debts. In Uganda’s political economy, money is not invested; it is burnt in the bonfire of ambition.

A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggest if you took a billion shillings and point it at maize processing. Assume sh300m buys a modest 1–2 tonne/hour mill (crusher, de-huller, sifters) and sh100m sorts site works, a transformer and basic handling gear. Put sh300m into revolving working capital to buy grain. Keep sh200m as six months’ operating float (wages, power, transport) and sh100m as contingency.

Run 200 tonnes/month through the plant. Even at a conservative 15 percent value-add on raw maize (from flour + bran), that’s roughly sh36m in gross value created each month. Payroll, power and logistics might eat sh30m, still leaving a thin operating surplus of sh6m/month — and the kicker is elsewhere: the revolving working capital puts sh2.5–3.0 billion a year into farmers’ pockets as you buy and turn stock; the plant sustains 25–40 direct jobs and steadies prices for hundreds of smallholders.

Push to a double-shift (300 tonnes/month) or add a simple packing line and the surplus thickens, the wage bill supports more households, and local tax flows become real — every single year. That is what one campaign-day’s burn can seed in one county.

The extractive nature of our politics means institutions that should broaden opportunity have become toll gates for privilege...

When last year Parliament proposed to hold sittings around the country at five billion shillings a day, it is sold as inclusion, but in reality it is nothing more than a show at the taxpayer’s expense. When MPs defend their emoluments more fiercely than they do their constituents’ needs, it is clear where their priorities lie. The system works, yes, but not for the many. It works brilliantly for the few who can grab a seat inside.

The violence and defiance in the primaries are not aberrations; they are the logical outcome of a politics where the rewards are grotesquely outsized. The slope we are sliding down is steep and getting steeper.

Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson in their book Why Nations Fail remind us that countries thrive when they build inclusive institutions. They fail when their institutions become extractive, enriching a narrow elite at the expense of the majority. Uganda today increasingly resembles the latter.

To put it bluntly the primaries are not a democratic exercise; they are an auction of access to state resources. The slap in the face of the Prime Minister was symbolic. The bigger slap is the one delivered daily to citizens whose schools remain unstaffed, whose hospitals remain under-equipped, and whose farms remain unfunded, while billions are blown on campaigns and salaries...

Already young Ugandans believe the only path to wealth is not through innovation or entrepreneurship but through joining the scramble for office. That is tragic. When politics becomes the business, the economy is relegated to the feeding trough.

This trajectory cannot end well. History is littered with countries that ignored the early warning signs, only to stumble into disorder and collapse. If campaign budgets run into billions while factories rust and farms wither, if parliamentary salaries soar while public service decays, if violence replaces debate even in internal contests, then the end is clear.

The NRM primaries should not be dismissed as an internal matter. They are a mirror held up to our political soul. What it reflects is not confidence but desperation, not service but self-interest, not inclusion but exclusion. Unless we confront this extractive logic  by trimming the perks of office, redirecting campaign billions into production, and making politics less about paychecks and more about service, we are condemning ourselves to a slope that leads nowhere but down...

And at the bottom, it will not just be the politicians who pay the price. It will be all of us.

NRM DAY: THE LIBERALISED ECONOMY IS THE GIFT THAT KEEPS GIVING

Yesterday we commemorated the National Resistance Movement (NRM) day.

This time 39 years ago, the NRM had taken over control of a country riven with political instability and an economy that was barely on its feet.

As President Yoweri Museveni’s government tried to establish control over all of Uganda, the resuscitation of the economy could not wait.

"The economy had regressed to below 1970 levels, industrial production had collapsed, infrastructure was dilapidated and barely any new capacity had been added in two decades, coffee dominated the economy, providing most of the tax revenues and almost all export receipts...

This would have been all very fine if the population growth had followed the economy’s negative trend, but there were twice as many Ugandans in 1986 as at Independence, putting increasing strain on a stuttering economy.

From a purely intellectual level the solution was simple, increase production to create jobs, mobilise tax revenues to support, much needed infrastructure rehabilitation and key social services.

Easier said than done.

At the time, government had dozens of companies doing everything from supermarkets to fishnet making, that were producing below capacity, remitting little to no revenues to the treasury, while their payrolls and running costs were putting immense pressure on the budget. They were mismanaged, had fallen into disrepair and to resuscitate them would cost a lot of money. Monies the government did not have.

Initially, government since there was little tax revenue coming in, thought it could print money and finance the rehabilitation of these industries, get production up and running and everything would be ok. But the laws of economics will not be mocked and they soon found themselves battling runaway inflation, which frustrated any efforts to get the economy up and running again.

At the height of the inflation pressures , prices were doubling every three months.

Inflation the increase in prices, is a disincentive to production. Because it is difficult to plan for the future, discourages consumption, putting a ceiling on demand, hence frustrating expansion of production. A vicious cycle.

So to get the economy up and running they had to source funding abroad. The external funders were not our mothers. There was little charity to be had. They offered to lend us the money, on condition that we liberalise the economy, especially by breaking up the state owned monopolies, selling them off and opening up their respective sectors to competition.

The idea was that if we instituted these reforms, they would have a better chance of getting repaid.

While foreign capital with greater pools of money to back it up, ended up taking the juicier companies, removing the yoke of state owned monopolies, gave opportunities for Ugandans to go into general trade and industry.

Now the retail trade, transport, real estate development and most other economic activity is dominated by private players and the Ugandan consumer is the better for it, enjoying wide availability and choice of almost any commodities.

This liberalization of the economy, which unlocked individual initiative, has made the general economy more robust and able to weather the occasional storm, may be the biggest economic legacy of the NRM in general and Museveni era in particular.

I shudder to think what would have happened if government still had a monopoly over supermarkets, transport, telecommunications and banking, how things would be today.

The critics argue that today the economy does not work for the everyday man,  that a few people – mostly the urban elite, are benefitting disproportionately from the economic gains of the last four decades. And they will be right.

But their recommendation to disband the market economy and revert to a more centrally controlled economy would be wrong and setting the economy up for failure.

First of all, the market does not promise equitable distribution of benefits. In fact, left to its own devices it will ensure that the rich become richer and the poor become poorer. The promise of the market is that in the right environment, it grows the wealth of the economy. There is no other known mechanism that can do that more efficiently.

The distribution of this expansion of wealth lies solely with the government.

If the private sector is failing to grow wealth, blame the government for not creating the conducive environment for them to thrive. In an environment where the economy is growing consistently, but the income and wealth disparities are widening, blame it on the government.

Government through the taxation of economic activity funds, the maintenance of peace and security, building of infrastructure, social services and other public goods. In so doing they not only enhance the enabling environment for the private sector to thrive, but also improve the citizens capacities to take advantage of the improved economic situation.

So from the above, if an economy is working and but not for the everyday man its an indictment on government and not the market.

The people calling for a return to the controlled economy, think, wrongly, that the economy collapsed in the 1970s and 1980s for lack of money, and now since the government revenues have risen 100 fold they can take back the “commanding heights of the economy”.

That’s the reason they tell us all.

Me thinks, failing to operate in a competitive environment, they want government to get back into business so that criteria, other than merit and performance – like family and tribe, can once again apply to accessing opportunity.

 

 

THE MUSEVENI ECONOMIC LEGACY

Last week I was involved in an online conversation about the economic achievements of President Yoweri Museveni’s administration. The conversation was prompted by the impending 80^th birthday of the President, which happened on the weekend.

It is a subject that should and will be discussed well into the future.

A brief recap of history is important.

When the National Resistance Movement (NRM) came to power in 1986 they found an economy in shambles, brought to its knees by the years of instability and economic contraction of the 1970s and 1980s.

"To resuscitate the economy, the NRM fought to bring inflation under control, privatized government parastatals to get them back into production and liberalised the economy to unlock individual initiative, which, up to that point, was discouraged by insecurity and suppressed by government monopolies. The government also worked to rehabilitate infrastructure and provide other public goods like security, health and education....

No less a figure than Singapore’s founding father Lee Kuan Yew in 1988, dismissed Uganda’s case as hopeless and did not think its fourtunes would be restored in a 100 years.

Since that January day in 1986 the economy has been on an unbroken growth streak, production has not only been restored but expanded, macroeconomic stability has been achieved and the economy is diversified away from an overreliance on coffee.

The economy still has a long way to go. The widening wealth disparity has to be addressed urgently, before it threatens national stability, by fighting corruption and increasing the productivity of the rural areas.

There is not enough space in this column to address all the achievements of the last four decades but off the top my head two initiatives were key in turning the economy around.

The first was ensuring security. This is critical to allow for investment by local and foreign businessmen. It would make no sense to invest in a home or enterprise if you are not sure that you will be alive next year or even the next day. The Kampala urban sprawl is evidence of this. 

In 1986 Kampala stopped at Kibuye roundabout in the south, Wandegeya in the north, Lugogo in the east and just before Natete in the west. As people have grown confident in the future of the house they have invested in homes and businesses that has grown Kampala more than tenfold from its 600,000 population in 1986.

The second was the liberalization of the economy. In those days there were government companies in everything from supermarkets to petrol stations, from housing estates to fishing boats. And all these were virtual monopolies in their sectors, ineffective, inefficient and draining the lifeblood from tax payer.

By privatizing these and opening the market to competition, government not only turned on the production taps but also harnessed the market to create sustainable growth.

Professor John Kay in his seminal book “The truth about markets” explained that the market is really a series of experiments by businessmen every minute, every day, every time. The experiments that work grow and those that don’t are dropped by the way side. Out of this chaos, creative destruction, which mirrors the evolutionary process, is born growth and wealth. No central authority anywhere in the world can replicate these multitude of experiments with any success, which is why governments all over the world fail at business.

People who pander for central control of the economy are often a small clique, who have failed in the market, but are connected to government and see government involvement as a way to get back in the game. It is to their benefit and not to the benefit of everyday man.

"Forced by necessity more than conviction the NRM liberalized the economy and in so doing unlocked the individual initiatives of local and foreign businessmen and the economy has been better for the experience...

Currently we are at a cross road.

While the market is the most effective mechanism for growing wealth it is probably the worst for distributing that wealth. Distribution of wealth is government’s role by taxing economic activity and using revenues to finance public goods. If the economy is growing as Uganda’s is but inequalities continue to persist and growth it is an indictment on government’s competence or lack of in the distribution of the wealth that is created.

Government distribution of wealth does not mean standing at the corner and dishing out money. Distribution often entails giving the population the means to take advantage of the economic opportunities that come with economic growth by keeping them safe, educating them, providing health services, access to markets through developing infrastructure, both hard and soft and for the most marginalized, a leg up by providing social security.

Museveni’s legacy will be cemented by the equitable distribution of the economic gains of the last 40 years.

As it is now the biggest beneficiaries are people living in urban areas, who are educated and can leverage this to get employment or compete in the market as businessmen. Given the system that the NRM uprooted that gave access to a few – there were barely 5000 students in University in 1986, often to the detriment of the majority, the beneficiaries continue to be a few.

"Going into the next four decades the economy must continue to grow, there can be no development without growth, but there has to be a more systematic and consistent effort to ensure this growth is shared out more equitably...

Happy birthday Mzee!

PRESCRIPTIONS FOR UGANDA'S NEXT 38 YEARS

Last week we commemorated 38 years of the National Resistance Movement (NRM).

There is a lot to be proud of. No less a figure than Singaporean former leader Lee Kuan Yew speaking in 1998 did not give Uganda a chance in 100 years to get back up on its feet. At the time the NRM was two years in power having inherited a country that was barely functional and an economy that had regressed to pre-1970 levels...

To add salt to injury there were insurgencies in the north and east, which were taking priority of the meagre national resources.

The rebellion mostly in the north, which lasted into this century, served as a lodestone on economic progress, as almost one in five of the country’s population was not producing or consuming meaningfully.

The end of the war on Ugandan soil from around 2002, meant northern Uganda could reenter the productive economy and the results have been telling.

Uganda’s per capita GDP has jumped almost four-fold to $934 at the end of 2022 according to the World Bank, from $241 in 2002. Interestingly per capita GDP fell back to 2002 levels from $253 in 1986.

One can argue that by 2002 a growth momentum had set in, from earlier reforms that liberalized the economy, but it is hard to discount the effect of the reentry into the economy of northern Uganda and West Nile.

However, an argument can be made that we have underperformed given the human capital we have, the natural endowments and the peace the rest of the nation has enjoyed.

That being as it is I would like to look to the next 38 years to see how we accelerate the development trajectory.

1.       Root out corruption

The recent Auditor General’s report reports a continued trend towards more and more waste in government. Its not that our officials are clumsy and letting valuable shillings disappear into thin air, more that they are keeping more and more of our tax shillings for themselves. This is affecting service delivery, concentrating resources in a few connected people’s hands and even worse, distorting markets by overinflating asset prices and underpricing genuine businessmen. Not only is this trend grinding the economy to a halt but also poses a serious threat to national stability and security.

2.       Leaner government

Relatedly we need to cut back on the cost of public administration, especially because the bloated public sector has increased the surface area for corruption with little attendant improvement in production. Leaner government would allow government to focus on what its supposed to do which is facilitate the private sector to produce and equitably distribute the ensuing growth. Leaner government also means government not succumbing to the temptation to go back into business...

3.       Greater emphasis on human capacity development

A few years ago an argument was made in the The Economist magazine that given a choice between human capital and infrastructure development, the smart money is on improving the quality of the population. The argument was that once the people are better educated and healthy they will find a way around the infrastructure deficits. However, if the quality of the people is wanting all the infrastructure in the world will count for little as they will not be able to exploit it to improve their living standards. School enrollement has to continue to rise but more importantly we need to reduce the drop out rate, about 1.4 million a year the last number I saw. We must increase access to quality health services. We must increase opportunities by improving the business environment to absorb all these quality Ugandans entering the job market.

4.       Continued infrastructure development

While we have made significant strides in infrastructure development – except rail transport, we are far behind what our ambitions require in road, energy and social infrastructure. Using roads as an example we have about 16 km of paved road per square km, which is well below what an average middle income country which is around 80 km per sq km. We have all seen in our various suburbs how much new economic activity is generated when a tarmac road is laid. The same deficiencies are seen in everything from electricity generation and consumption, to health center and school facilities to housing. Infrastructure is what unlocks the latent economy.

Invest in agriculture extension 

A recent study showed that for sub-Saharna africa to make its biggest gains in agriculture investing in agricultural extension services and irrigation are your best bet. we have been seating on our laurels for too long, to thepoint that our agriculture is still using means of pre-agricultural revolution times. Extension workers who will improve the productivity of our small holder farmers is critical. It is a scandal that while agriculture provides the livelihood of seven in 10 Ugandans it acocunts for less than 30 percent of GDP and has not enjoyed double digit growth in any one year in the last 40 years, hence the prevalence of poverty in Uganda.

 

5.        Export led growth

And finally, we need to focus on producing for export rather than import substitution. As the Asian tigers showed focusing on export led growth improves the quality of products and creates more jobs. Import substitution benefits a few connected people, does not improve quality standards and generally lowers livings standards by condemning the population to endure substandard goods. The evidence is all around us the export targeted Lato has better quality products, in adequate quantities and changing the socio-economic status of farmers in Ntungamo than their local competitors who are content to serve the Ugandan market.

 

This is by no means a comprehensive nor original list, the challenge for the next 38 years is the execution of these ideas. Hopefully we will look back in 38 years and we would have far exceeded our expectations.

FOR GOD AND MY COUNTRY!

 

WHY THE OPPOSITION IS STILL IN THE WILDERNESS

This week the Forum for Democratic Change(FDC) split was formalizedwith the calling of an extraordinary delegates meeting that saw the party president  Patrick Oboi Amuriat and his secretary general Nandala Mafabi thrown out of office.

The delegates conference called by party chairman Wasswa Birigwa installed Lord Mayor Erias Lukwago and Harold Kaija in their place.

The Amuriat clique dismissed the move as inconsequential and as far they are concerned, they are still in place.

It is a sad event, an inevitable one that came as no surprise to those who have been watching Ugandan politics for the last few years.

"While the opposition’s most obvious challenge is the uphill task of unseating President Yoweri Museveni and the National Resistance Movement (NRM), maintaining internal cohesion has proven just as, if not more difficult...

Because the promise of power is seems to be drawing further and further away, the romance of voluntarism is fading away fast.

But first a quick recap. When the NRM come to power in 1986 they froze party activity, which means there was no renewal within those parties. When party activity was freed again 20 years later, the leaders of 1986 were still in place.

That means a whole generation of leadership that should have taken over from the party grannies were still waiting and whole a new generation were pounding the doors for their turn at the pie.

Inevitably tensions mounted in parties, with many decamping to join new formations like FDC, to short circuit their route to the top.

With Museveni’s continued stay in power, opposition parties are being forced to renew themselves without having been in power. The tension between older leaders who think power is around the corner, if only they could hang on a little bit longer and the young turks, who think the old guard have failed dismally to wrestle power from the NRM, and should bow out gracefully or be shoved out with ignominy, is playing out now.

"The net effect is an increasingly fragmented opposition, which will ensure the continued stay of the NRM in power, unless they implode themselves...

The NRM does not suffer such upheavals for now, as they are the ruling party and can distribute patronage though government to keep everyone onside, even those who have their own presidential ambitions.

An NRM out of power would struggle like any of these parties, hence the unity of purpose at Kyagwe road when the elections come around, regardless of the internal mutterings and grumblings between elections.

Time is not the friend of the party out of power. It took an almost about face in their ideology away from the left, for the UK Labour Party to win power in 1997.

The same can be said for a party in power for a long time. It loses its idealism and dynamism as parochial interests get entrenched, clogging down service delivery and perpetuating corruption. But the power of incumbency is such that they can paper over these cracks, longer than the much less resourced opposition parties can.

Leadership, more so in the opposition than in the ruling party, has to be unwavering in its commitment to the cause and able to transmit this conviction to the rank and file. If the leadership are there for their own personal enrichment and aggrandizement the foot soldiers will feel it quickly and their own commitment will suffer.

Opposition leaders often sell to their followers the promise that power is just around the corner. The thing they tell their supporters and the reality are often different. The trick is to maintain morale when the promises don’t come through as sold. The leaders own commitment to a far off vision is what is crucial and will allow him to keep selling a dream to the supporters.

And finally, the role of the state. No state is going to let you prosper when you are scheming to unseat them. Lost in the current drama is that the straw that has broken the back of the FDC is a quarrel over the distribution of monies whose source is not known, but highly suspected to come from intelligence.

Spreading dissension in enemy ranks is a legitimate tactic of war and politics. Such tactics find fertile ground in places where the leadership is infiltrated (stock in trade for the intelligence) or ambivalent in its commitment.

The death knell for the FDC was sounded with their dismal performance in the last election where they ceded their leading position in the opposition to National Unity Platform (NUP).

As a result of all of the above sadly FDC may very well be going the way of the Democratic Party (DP) and Uganda People’s Conference (UPC), both of which have succumbed to the inexorable march of time.

 

UGANDA ECONOMY 1962-2022: WHAT A RIDE

The story goes that an official Ministry of International Trade & Industry (MITI), responsible for the rehabilitation of the Japanese economy after the second world war, was asked what he thought were the effects of the French revolution on world history.

He thought for a bit and then answered, “Its too soon to tell”. The French revolution happened around 1789.

The anecdote may or may not have happened, but was used to show how farsighted Japanese planning is.

Yesterday we commemorated 60 years of Uganda’s independence from colonial rule. While 60 years is not as good a psychological divide as 50, it’s a good time to take stock of progress or lack of thereof.

According to World Bank figures the Uganda economy has grown to a GDP of $40.43 billion at the end of 2021 from $450m in 1962. This is an average annual growth rate of just under eight percent....

If you break it down into 20-year segments the fastest economic growth recorded was between 2002 and 2022 at 9.84%. The next fastest growth period was between 1962 and 1982 – 8.21% and finally the 1982-2002 period which grew by 5.34%.

Drilling a bit more under the surface makes for interesting observations, conclusions.

The first two decades of independence had as its major economic events, the declaration of independence, which saw the expansion of services and unleashed the suppressed initiative of Ugandans. Obote’s attempts to “move to the left” – embrace socialism, did not gain traction partly because they were not thought through, but also because he run out of time with the 1971 coup which brought Idi Amin to power.

The descent into chaos under Amin seemed not to have dented the post-independence growth momentum, with GDP per capita peaking at $258 in 1977 before collapsing to $100 in 1980. This suggests that the economic foundations set up by the colonial administration and the first Obote administration, were robust enough to hold for about five years before terminal decline set in. The reality on the ground of course was economic hardship was already being felt well be before 1977.

The expelling of the Asians, the major commercial class and the descent into widespread insecurity, meant businesses were operating below their full capacity or shutting down all together. This is important because it’s the private sector that grows wealth and not the government. If you hobble the private sector, even the government fails to play its distributive role of using taxes to uplift the living standards of its people through provision of law & order, social services and infrastructure.

Saddled with an economy that had regressed into subsistence and the breakout of the bush war in 1981, the 1982 – 2022 period started off on a false note. The last contractions of the economy happened in 1984 and 1985.

The return of stability in central and western Uganda after 1986 allowed the pullout from the decline of the previous 15 years to begin in earnest...

During this period major economic shifts came with the currency reform, the liberalisation of the exchange rate, the liberalization of commodities trade, brining inflation under control, the opening up of the telecommunications sector to introduce mobile phones and the sale of Uganda Commercial Bank (UCB). This among other initiatives unleashed individual initiative and attracted foreign direct investment.

The breakup of the state monopolies and the subsequent liberalization of the economy, underpinned by increased stability led to sustained growth of the economy. During this period too there was a coffee boom in 1994, with the failure of the Brazilian crop, which did a lot to boost coffee production and exports. In one year, the 1998 season Uganda exported more coffee than it produced, with the coffee from DRC making up the difference.

A period of dramatic rethink of our economy nevertheless only managed to bring us past the 1977 GDP per capita $248 level in 2004...

The next 20 years after 2002 as has been mentioned the economy raced to its fastest average growth rate as the liberalization policies begun to kick in, but probably, more importantly the northern Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) insurgency came to a close, allowing the northern region’s economy to reintegrate into the national economy.

Despite the war on terror, global financial crisis and more recently the Covid-19 pandemic the economy has continued to grow, with GDP per capita at $858 at the end of 2021 and poised to cross into the middle-income nation status. It helps that GDP was rebased twice during the period 2014 and 2019.

Growth is a given in this economy, as there remains a lot of untapped or unrecorded potential.

The challenge for the next 60 years is to ensure that this growth is more equitable. A situation of high growth and high inequality like Uganda, is an indictment on the government. The business community builds the wealth and the government distributes it. Distribution is not by some brainless mathematical allocation of cash but by using taxes to spread the opportunities around.

Improvements in and spreading of education and health services raise the earning capacity of the population; infrastructure development opens up opportunities to more people and law & order ensures that what we work, for we can keep. In as far as government is failing or unable to provide this, is the extent to which income and wealth inequalities persist in an economy....

One last thing, assuming we can maintain our growth momentum on GDP per capita from the last 20 years – 6.44% by 2082 our GDP per capita will increase to over $36,000.

GENERAL TUMWINE AND THE MAKING OF TOUGH TIMES

General Elly Tumwine was laid to rest on Tuesday after succumbing to cancer last week.

Tumwine was the army commander of the National Resistance Army (NRA) when they took over Kampala in 1986. He remained a high ranking official of the government and even when dropped as security minister in 2021, was still seen as a leading light of the NRM.

But whenever the origins of the NRA are revisited the fact that he shot the first shot that started the bush war in February 6, 1981 is trotted out. This made him a huge symbolic figure in the Movement’s history.

One wouldn’t fail to note the timing of Tumwine’s demise at the beginning of a week during which 48 Generals, him among them, many of them bushwar veterans, retired from the army.

Clearly a passing of an era is underway that would be interesting to put in perspective.

When the story is told of the beginnings of the bushwar we gloss over the fact that Tumwine and many of his contemporaries, many university graduates, were the crème de la crème of their generation.

When I went to university much later in 1992 it was impressed upon me that of all the kids I started primary school with only 2,000 or about 0.1 percent of us had made it to University. At that time there were only two universities, Makerere and Mbarara University of Science & Technology (MUST). If that was true for us imagine how much truer this was for the Tumwine’s?

The Amin administration by the time Tumwine graduated, had decimated the economy, but earlier generation’s reported that before they had finished their final exams they already had job offers from government and the top corporate companies.

"That these princes could have forsaken their place at the high table of society to become outlaws suggests two things; either they were mentally unstable or the times were so desperate they could not see any hope for the future, despite their high qualifications....

People who know these ladies and gentlemen more intimately, report that they are as sound of mind as the next man.

When you came out of university you were hopeful for the future and ready to take on the world, this clearly was not the case in 1981, at least for Tumwine and his contemporaries.

Despite their larger-than-life personas today and their influence on society over the last three decades, these renegades were the minority in a population, which had resigned itself to the leadership of the day.

It can be argued that they lost their idealism as soon as they assumed the reins of power. The dynamics of running a state means they have had to face up to the realities of what it takes to hang on to power. It is often a messy business and forces men and women to do things they never dreamed they would do.

 Uganda nor the NRM is no different.

Power gives one the ability to influence events, without power your vision for the future remains a pipe dream. How you exercise that power is down to the wielder of that power and what society is willing to allow you to get away with.

Its for this reason, if you want to be remembered as a hero or saint, die young or do not wield power. That is why we venerate people like Jesus, Che Gueverra, Thomas Sankara and John F Kennedy on one hand and Mahtma Ghandi, Mother Theresa and even Nelson Mandela on the other.  Exercising power Is not for the faint hearted and rarely leaves those in power with unsoiled hands.

So it should come as no surprise that a section of society feel hard done by Tumwine and his contemporaries on one hand, while the generals maintain the conviction of their cause, shown by the way some of them closed ranks behind Tumwine.

One image that emerged from events surrounding the General’s farewell was the a 28-second video clip of dozens of 4WDs leaving Kololo Ceremonial Grounds after Tumwine’s state funeral. Most of these were official government cars, an indication of how much richer government is than it was when the young Tumwines threw their fate at the mercy of the gods.

This event brought to mind the saying, “Tough times create strong men; Strong men create good times; Good times create weak men; Weak men create tough times”

 

 

POWER ONLY RESPECTS POWER

 Recent events locally and internationally have cemented the fact that power only respects power and two, that those involved in the game of power are always on the look out to extend their own and minimise their opponent’s advantage.

Locally we saw the National Resistance Movement (NRM) first coopting Democratic Party (DP) president Norbert Mao (Its not clear whether the party is coming along) to its agenda and then pulling out all stops to win the Soroti East constituency.

Internationally, we saw Russia continuing its campaign in Ukraine despite the world’s criticism. For Russia the campaign in Ukraine is not another thing on the day’s to do list but a real existential threat, the loss of which will come with consequences to dire to bare.

And finally, US house speaker Nancy Pelosi made a symbolic visit to Taiwan despite loud protestations by Beijing. US official policy remains for a one-China policy. Pelosi’s visit was a case study in the separation of powers in practice I the US government.

"In all these cases it is clear power seeks to always concentrate more power to itself and loath to allow it dissipate away from itself....

When you are at the top of the hill you have a strategic advantage and most of your effort is expended in defending that position from challengers. This may entail fending off the challengers’ attacks head on or spread dissension in their ranks with the aim of blunting their resolve.

Its not time to seat on your laurels once you have attained power, something the NRM knows all too well.

On one television talk show an opposition member was whining about the NRM wanting to win everything even a “small” constituency like Soroti East. For the leader nothing is too small, as losing even once can be blown out of proportion by the opponents to give them impression that this is the beginning of the end. And in the game of power, perception trumps fact often enough.

Another thing is that power is amoral. The end justifies the means. You cannot appeal to its better nature or shame it into good behaviour. For those out of power, raising moral objections to the actions of power is a way to appeal to the court of public opinion and hope the public will be disgusted enough to do something. Hope though, is not a strategy....

As we have seen in Ukraine, Russia on one hand is fighting the Ukrainian forces but also working to demoralize the public through “accidental” bombings of malls, theaters and residential areas. It is also working to weaken the EU’s unity by denying the gas, critical for heating in the coming winter season. Western observers are crying themselves hoars about war crimes, but the Russians are continuing along their merry way.

The issue of war crimes is also a hazy one. When war is declared who are the enemy? The man in uniform seeking to end you, is clearly an enemy combatant but what about the civilians who cheer them on, offer them refuge and would not be averse to shooting you in the back in support of their own forces? The theory is clear but in the chaos of battle, clarity is a casualty.

In the last week, the US killed Al Qaeda strong man Ayman al-Zawahiri believed to be responsible for the September 11, 2001 bombing of the Twin Towers in New York and the earlier bombing of the Kenyan and Tanzanian embassies in 1998.

Using high precision missiles fired from a drone Al Zawahiri was killed as he stood on his verandah. There were reports that the missiles do not explode but rather use blades to kill only the target, minimizing collateral damage. However, footage released later showed the top floor of the building Al Zawahiri was believed to be in, was flattened. Its hard to believe any one in his vicinity survived. War crime or not? Who decides?

Power only understands power. If there is no equal and opposite reaction, power will have its way.

The US argues that while the official policy is to recognize one China with Taiwan they cannot interfere with the working of the legislature for which Pelosi is the speaker of Congress. China would have cognitive challenges understanding how all arms of government do not work in unison. The truth of course is that Taiwan continues to exist as an independent nation because the US has promised to defend their independence. Without that you can rest assured they would be back in the China fold quicker than you can say Chiang Kai-Shek.

"The point is power operates according to a different moral code than the wielders of power preach to us. Power has little use for the golden rule – treat your neighbour as yourself. It has its uses, in indoctrinating Sunday schoolers.